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Abstract
Merger review is the most active area of U.S. antitrust policy. It is now widely believed
that merger policy must move beyond its traditional focus on short-run, price and output
effects to account for longer-run effects on technological innovation. The question is,
how should merger policy adapt to technological change? Some have argued that the
right response is for antitrust authorities to reduce merger enforcement to prevent
unintended harm to innovation. Others have suggested that the enforcement agencies
analyze a merger’s effects on innovation using the same framework they use to analyze a
transaction’s effects on prices and output levels. We argue that merger authorities should
neither treat innovation like price and output under the existing framework nor retreat
from enforcement in the name of innovation. We examine how merger policy should
change both to accommodate the influence of innovation on traditional, static efficiency
concerns and to recognize that innovation can itself be an important dimension of market
performance affected by a merger.
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Introduction
Policy makers and economists strongly agree that innovation is a critical component of a
sustained, healthy economy. It is no accident that policy makers’ concern with fostering
innovation grew over the course of the 1980’s and 1990’s, a period during which those industrial
sectors typically defined as “high technology,” such as aerospace, telecommunications,
biotechnology, software, and computers, increased their combined share of manufacturing output
by more than 50 percent.1
At the same time that innovation has become a central focus of economic policy, merger
enforcement has been the most active area of U.S. antitrust policy. From 1991 to 2002, the
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice conducted an average of 161 merger
investigations each year, which is more than all of the division’s other civil and criminal
investigations combined.2 Merger investigations constitute a similarly important part of the
Federal Trade Commission’s “Maintaining Competition Mission.”3
The fact that much of the merger activity in recent years has occurred in the industries
attracting attention because of their innovation-based growth highlights the question of how well
traditional merger enforcement accounts for technological change. Merger policy faces a
perplexing problem in industries marked by ongoing technological innovation; a problem related,
in part, to the uncertain fit between the market conditions that produce innovation and the market
conditions to which antitrust policy aspires and, in part, to uncertainty about how innovation
might affect market structure and performance. Antitrust law in general is concerned with the
structure of markets and the behavior of firms within those markets. Merger enforcement in
particular is concerned with preserving meaningful competition and protecting consumer welfare
when business enterprises attempt to combine. At the heart of merger policy is antitrust law’s
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Economic Report of the President 1999 Washington: United States Government Printing Office, at ____.
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An average of 131 other investigations were conducted per year (United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics 1991-2002). Non-merger antitrust actions include criminal
prosecutions of price-fixing cartels, as well as civil actions against individual companies found to have
engaged in anticompetitive practices (e.g., the Microsoft case).
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See Federal Trade Commission, Fiscal Year 2002 Congressional Budget Justification (April 9, 2001),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/2002budgetjustification.pdf, p. 46-60.
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presumption that greater competition in the form of reduced product-market concentration brings
improved market performance and increased consumer benefits in the form of lower prices,
higher quality, and higher output. Although this presumption is reasonably well accepted for
consumer welfare effects due to changes in short-term price and output levels, it is much less
accepted for consumer welfare effects due to changes in innovation, the flow of new products,
and other longer-term benefits. In some instances, innovation may be greater when concentration
is greater. Hence merger policy’s problem: if antitrust enforcement is to promote and not disrupt
the benefits of innovation, and if antitrust is properly to account for innovation’s effects on
market performance over time, to what extent should it adhere to its conventional, competitionoriented presumptions in markets characterized by technological change?
To the extent there are significant instances in which greater concentration is conducive
to innovation, innovative industries pose another central problem for antitrust enforcement: there
can be tradeoffs between static and dynamic objectives. Consumers benefit from competition
because, when producers face rivalry, they seek to attract customers through lower prices and
higher quality. Consumers also benefit from technological innovation because, when firms’
invest in research and development (R&D), they can create valuable new products and reduce the
costs of producing existing products. Product-market competition and innovation are both,
therefore, natural objectives of public policies designed to further consumer welfare. But
policies designed to pursue one of these objectives cannot always be implemented without costs
for the other. The patent system, for example, sometimes confers temporary monopolies on
inventors to encourage technological progress and sacrifices competition for the sake of
innovation. Antitrust law, in contrast, generally works against monopoly by restricting
anticompetitive conduct and preventing consolidations that lead to accumulations of market
power that undermine competition.
In the light of the potential tension between competition and innovation, and in the light
of the uncertainty that innovation creates for predictions about competitive effects of mergers and
future market conditions, a growing body of commentary has questioned the relationship of
antitrust law to innovation. More specifically, that commentary has criticized enforcement policy
toward mergers and acquisitions for attempting to preserve short- run price competition even

2

when doing so has adverse effects on technological progress and even where innovation is likely
to ameliorate a merger’s short-run harms to competition.
Antitrust authorities have themselves shared the critics’ recognition of innovation as an
important driver of national economic welfare. Enforcement officials have identified investment
in research and the diffusion of new technology as being among the most important dimensions
of market performance. One former head of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division
observed that “the more important that innovation becomes to society, the more important it is to
preserve economic incentives to innovate.”4 Another senior antitrust official stated that, “as
important as price competition is to us, a second major and possibly even greater concern is
maintaining competition for innovation.”5 These two statements illustratethe recognition that
innovation has important consequences for merger policy. But within them also lurks an
important question: does “maintaining competition for innovation” in fact “preserve economic
incentives to innovate”? In other words, does the static efficiency presumption that more
competition (as measured by the degree of concentration) is generally better carry over to
dynamic efficiency considerations?6 Thus, although antitrust policy has increasingly focused on
innovation, what exactly this new focus means or how it translates into enforcement can be
difficult to ascertain.
Given criticism of conventional enforcement and recognition of the importance of
innovation, two fundamental questions have arisen about the appropriate response of merger
policy. Should merger enforcement take innovation considerations into account? And, if so,
how? There is little consensus among scholars, policy makers, or practitioners about the answers
to these questions or about the appropriate degree of governmental intervention in markets with
significant actual or potential innovation.

4

Statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division of the U.S. Dept. of Justice before
the Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Subcommittee, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
March 22, 2000. p.6. Available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/4381.pdf.
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“Antitrust Considerations in International Defense Mergers,” address by Robert Kramer, Chief, Litigation II
Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice (May 4, 1999), p. 3.
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Of course even static efficiency may be higher with less competition if there are economies of scale and
“competition” is equated with the number of suppliers.
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Concern for the potential adverse effects of mergers on R&D has motivated some
scholars and policy makers to argue that merger enforcement must be active in markets
characterized by high levels of actual or potential innovation. They assert that the existing
framework for merger analysis can be applied to dynamic markets or, alternatively, that
incorporating innovation into merger review can be accomplished by modifying the standard
approach to merger analysis. One such proposed modification is to define “innovation
markets”—markets that encompass the actual and potential competitors in the research and
development for a future product—and to apply merger law to those markets in much the same
way that merger law is conventionally applied to markets for beer, bicycles, computer chips, or
any tangible good or service.
An opposing set of observers argues that, as a practical matter, “innovation markets” are
so difficult to define that they cannot be the basis for rational enforcement decisions. More
fundamentally, some of these opposing observers also argue that innovation provides a rationale
for a more permissive merger policy. One argument advanced in support of this line of reasoning
appeals to what is known as “Schumpeterian competition,” in which temporary monopolists
successively displace one another through innovation.7 Under Schumpeterian competition, there
may be little head-to-head price competition between the product market’s leading supplier and
its rivals at any given time, but there is ongoing innovation competition over time that challenges
the leading supplier to stay ahead of its competitors or lose its market position. Proponents of
permissive merger policy contend that mergers in such markets can do only limited harm because
of the constant competitive threat from new technologies and that merger may in fact help to
speed innovation by bringing complementary assets together. They argue that, in innovationbased industries, merger enforcement promises little benefit but risks the unintended effect of
slowing innovation by blocking mergers that would bring together complementary assets in a
way that would foster innovation.

7

Schumpeterian competition is named after Joseph Schumpeter, who asserted that it is a central feature of the
modern economy. Joseph A Schumpeter (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracracy, New York:
Harper & Row, Chapters 7-8. For a discussion of antitrust policy toward single-firm conduct in markets
characterized by Schumpeterian competition, see Evans, David S., and Richard Schmalensee (2002) “Some
Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries,” in Innovation Policy and
the Economy, Vol. 2, Jaffee, Lerner, and Stern (ed.s), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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Even those who favor the use of innovation markets by merger authorities divide over
whether, once such markets are defined, the anti-concentration presumptions of merger law
should apply to them or should instead be withdrawn in favor of a neutral, fact-intensive inquiry
into whether the merger will hinder innovation. And those who reject the innovation market idea
divide over whether merger enforcement should continue along conventional lines or, in keeping
with the “Schumpeterian” idea, systematically retreat in the face of uncertainty over the effects of
merger enforcement on technological innovation.
These debates have yielded substantial sentiment in favor of systematic retreat from
conventional enforcement guidelines and presumptions.8 They have produced less, but not
insignificant, support for incorporating innovation into the conventional framework through the
analysis of innovation markets; and some, but even less, argument in favor of maintaining merger
enforcement’s narrow focus on short-run price competition or at least applying the same
competitive presumptions to innovation that apply to static price and output measures.
In this paper, we offer our own answers to the questions of whether and how merger
enforcement should take innovation into account. Our answer to the question of whether merger
policy should take innovation into account is “yes.” Our answer the question of how it should do
so is to propose several changes to the presumptions and analytical framework of the current
merger enforcement process. We argue that merger enforcement should neither systematically
retreat from markets characterized by significant innovation nor assume that innovation
competition can be appropriately treated in a manner wholly parallel to price competition.
Instead, our analysis suggests that merger policy should strengthen its current framework by
implementing a better understanding of the relationships between competition and innovation.
We propose several specific ways to strengthen merger review, and we also discuss how merger
policy can develop a more sophisticated approach for incorporating uncertainty about future
economic events into enforcement decisions.
We begin in Section I with a discussion of the conventional approach to merger review.
In Section II, we discuss the challenges that innovation poses for the conventional analysis and
examine the policy debate that has arisen in response to those challenges. In Section III, we
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Ronald W. Davis, “Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: Current Practice in Perspective,” 71
Antitrust L.J. 677 (2003) at ___.
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examine how antitrust law’s underlying presumption that consumer welfare increases with
competition applies where consumer welfare may be affected by technological innovation. In
Sections IV through VII, we examine the likelihood that the established framework for merger
enforcement can successfully address the inter-relationship between market structure and
innovation and what changes would be necessary to improve merger review in technologically
dynamic settings. Throughout Sections IV through VII, we develop a series of findings and
recommendations about how merger policy can better accommodate innovation considerations.
Those successive sections work through the major steps and assumptions of the established
merger-review framework and identify the challenges innovation presents for them. To illustrate
how these challenges are met in practice, in Section VIII we discuss and evaluate merger cases in
which the antitrust agencies have focused on innovation. We conclude in Section IX with a set
of policy recommendations. We then apply those recommendations to a recent merger case to
illustrate how our proposed approach would affect enforcement in practice.
I.

Conventional Merger Review
As groundwork for understanding the implications of innovation for the application of

merger policy, we first present a brief survey of the current U.S. merger-review process.9 The
vast majority of mergers challenged by the U.S. antitrust agencies—the Antitrust Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice (Justice Department) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—are
challenged under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Act makes it illegal for one company to
acquire some or all of the assets of a competitor where the effects “may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”10 The statute reflects the fundamental premise of
merger policy, and of antitrust policy in general, that increased competition results in improved

9

Although our focus is on the United States, it is worth observing that the European Commission and many
other competition policy agencies in other regions and nations have modeled their merger-review processes
in whole or in part on the U.S. approach.
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15 U.S.C. Section 18. Mergers can also be challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 1, which bars “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”
In addition, private challenges can be made against mergers (although they face antitrust-injury and
standing hurdles), which may be motivated by very different considerations than governmental challenges.
Our focus here is on public policy.
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economic performance.11 Specifically, antitrust policy is grounded on the belief that competitive
markets generally do the best job of producing and delivering at the lowest feasible prices the
goods and services consumers want, and the statutes are typically interpreted as imposing a
consumer-welfare standard.
Economists generally favor some notion of economy-wide efficiency over a consumerwelfare standard.12 Although some antitrust commentators write as if the pursuit of overall
economic efficiency and the maximization of consumer welfare are identical objectives, they are
not.13 The critical difference is that economy-wide efficiency involves accounting for the effects
of actions on the welfare of both producers and consumers, while a consumer-welfare standard
considers only the latter.14
Under the consumer-welfare standard, agencies challenge mergers they think likely to
increase the ability of the merged parties to control prices and output of given goods and
services. The courts use a largely standardized process to evaluate mergers when the agencies
bring such legal challenges.15 In brief, merger analysis forms a prediction of a proposed
transaction’s effects on consumer welfare by examining present characteristics of the parties to
the transaction and the market setting in which those parties operate. The agencies’ review
focuses on how the merging parties’ combination will affect market concentration, which is

11

See, e.g., Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div_stats/9142.pdf (2001), Sections 1, 2, 4; Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors on the FTC web site (04/2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf, p. 1, 4, 6.
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This is a matter of judgment, rather than economic theory. Moreover, the theoretical and empirical tools of
economics are extremely valuable in assessing mergers under a consumer-welfare standard.
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See, e.g., Neven, Damien J., and Lars-Hendrik Roller (2000) “Institution Design: The Allocation of
jurisdiction in international antitrust,” European Economic Review 44: 845-855.
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It should be observed, however, that application of the consumer surplus standard in antitrust policy is
tempered by the fact that consumer harm is of concern to antitrust policy only if it arises from harm to
competition. Thus, it is not illegal for a monopolist to charge “high” prices if that monopoly has been
legitimately obtained. And antitrust policy does not seek drive prices below their competitive level even if
doing so might increase consumer surplus (at least in the short run).

15

See, e.g., Baker, Jonathan B. (2003) “Responding to developments in economics and the courts: Entry in
the merger guidelines,” Antitrust Law Journal 71:189-206, and Scheffman, David, Malcolm Coate, and
Louis Silvia (2003) “Twenty years of merger guidelines enforcement at the FTC: An economic
perspective,” Antitrust Law Journal 71: 277-318.
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taken as a key indicator of competitive effects, and whether there are offsetting benefits, known
as efficiencies.16
The federal antitrust agencies have issued a set of Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Merger
Guidelines) that purport to provide a blueprint for how the agencies will conduct their analysis of
a merger.17 These guidelines provide a specific market-definition methodology as well as
benchmarks for the assessment of concentration.18 The Merger Guidelines do not have the force
of law and, indeed, the Merger Guidelines explicitly (and accurately) state that the agencies may
pursue different lines of argument in litigation.19 Nonetheless, the broad contours of the Merger
Guidelines process have been widely adopted by the agencies and the courts. That process can
be summarized as consisting of four main steps.
1. Market Definition and Market Share Determination. Antitrust policy is premised on a
general presumption that an increase in concentration will harm consumer welfare. In order to
determine the effects of a merger on market concentration, it is necessary to define one or more
relevant markets.20 Defining market boundaries with respect to their product and geographic
scopes is thus a first step under the Merger Guidelines and is also typically an early issue in any
merger litigation.21 Indeed, given the weight that the courts attach to market concentration
measures and the extent to which these measures depend on how market boundaries are drawn, it
is often said that the outcome of merger litigation turns almost entirely on whether the market is
defined narrowly or broadly and, thus, on whether the merging parties are viewed as having few
or many competitors.22

16

See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 n. 12 (11th Cir.1991); FTC v. PPG Industries,
Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C.Cir.1986); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.Supp. 1066, 1081-82 (D.D.C.1997).
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United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
rev. April 8, 1997 (hereafter, Merger Guidelines).

18

It is questionable whether the agencies actually use the benchmarks stated in the Merger Guidelines.

19

Merger Guidelines, Section 0.1.

20

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)

21

See, e.g., Merger Guidelines, Section 1; Toys R Us v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).

22

See, e.g., Parker, Richard G. (1998) “Trends in Merger Enforcement and Litigation, § 2,” available at:
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/parker.htm>.
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An increase in concentration in the relevant product and geographic markets is taken as a
proxy for a decrease in competition that—if large enough—will lead to a significant increase in
the prices faced by consumers.23 In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, for example,
the Supreme Court defined the relevant product as a cluster of services that constitute
commercial banking and defined the relevant geographical market as the four-county area in
which the merging parties had offices.24 The Court held that a merger between the region’s first
and second largest banks, which would have given the merged entity a 35 percent market share
measured in terms of assets, created impermissible concentration and had to be enjoined.25
Modern merger policy does not contain a rigid market share threshold such as that
suggested by the Court in Philadelphia National Bank. Instead, merger analysis today begins
with a set of presumptions established in the Guidelines, and these presumptions are based on a
measure of market structure that is more nuanced than simply adding the market shares of the
merging parties. The Guidelines adopt the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which one
calculates by taking the individual market share of each firm in the market, squaring it, and then
adding all the squared figures together to get a single index number. This “sum of the squares of
the market shares” figure communicates two important things that a single firm’s market share or
a four-firm concentration ratio (another measure used in the past) does not: a picture of
concentration for the entire relevant market, and a measure of the distribution of market shares
across all firms in the market. The HHI is higher where market share is unevenly distributed
across firms than if it is evenly distributed, thus capturing the idea that a market with five evenly
sized firms may be more vigorously competitive than a market with one very big firm and several
smaller ones. Consider, for example, two alternative market structures, the first with five evenly
sized firms and the second with one firm that has 60 percent of the market and four firms with 10

23

For the most part, economic theory and antitrust policy have long favored more competitors over fewer for
the purpose of lowering prices, expanding output, and making consumers better off. There are, however,
limited exceptions to this view. For example, certain industries in which per-unit cost declines as output
increases to the point that it is most efficient to have just one firm producing all output in a given market
have come to be known as natural monopolies. Historically, telecommunications networks were a leading
example, and public policy actually served to limit entry. That view has since changed. For instance, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. Sections 151 et seq, seeks to promote competitive entry.

24

374 U.S. 321 (1963).

25

Ibid.
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percent each. The HHI for the first market would be 2000. The HHI for the second market would
be 3000. Each market has the same number of competitors, but the higher HHI number for the
second market reflects the market power that a firm with a 60 percent share may be able to
exercise.
Depending on the level of HHI, the antitrust agencies adopt different presumptions about
the impact of the proposed merger. Under the Guidelines, if the post- merger HHI would be
below 1000, the agencies consider the market to be unconcentrated and generally view the
merger as unlikely to have adverse effects on competition. If the post-merger HHI is between
1000 and 1800, the agencies label the market moderately concentrated and become concerned
only if the merger would raise the HHI more than 100 points within that range. Post-merger
HHIs above 1800 are the most likely to trigger an enforcement action under the Guidelines. Such
markets are deemed highly concentrated and mergers that have the effect of raising the HHI more
than 50 points in the range above 1800 raise concerns, while those proposed transactions that
would raise the HHI more than 100 points are presumed to be anticompetitive.
In actual practice, the U.S. antitrust agencies tend to challenge mergers only at
concentration levels much higher than 1800. One recent study found that few mergers have been
challenged with an HHI below 2000 and that, between 1999 and 2003, the median post-merger
HHI for a challenged transaction was 4500, with a median change in HHI of about 1200.26 One
reason for the discrepancy between the Guidelines’ levels and actual enforcement is due to the
fact that the HHI calculation supplies only a presumption of harm; a presumption that must be
followed by assessment of market factors other than concentration that determine a merger’s
competitive effects.
2. Competitive Effects Analysis. The typical next step in the antitrust analysis of a
proposed merger is to go beyond presumptions to predict its effects on competition. This more
intensive analysis of competitive effects generally focuses on two kinds of impacts a merger
might have: “unilateral” effects and “coordinated” effects. The Merger Guidelines define
unilateral effects as those that result “because merging firms may find it profitable to alter their

26

John Kwoka, “Some Thoughts on Concentration, Market Shares, and Merger Enforcement Policy,”
presented at the FTC/DOJ Workshop on Merger Enforcement, Washington, D.C., February 17, 2004
(available at http://www. ftc.gov/bc/mergerenforce/presentations/040217kwoka.pdf).
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behavior unilaterally following the acquisition by elevating price and suppressing output.”27 The
ability a merger creates for the combined firm profitably to raise prices or cut output without the
necessity of cooperation from rival suppliers is thus what gives rise to unilateral effects.
Coordinated effects, in contrast, are “comprised of actions by a group of firms that are profitable
for each of them only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others.”28 The increased
risk a merger creates for collusive behavior among would-be competitors is what gives rise to
coordinated effects.
Although the distinction between unilateral and coordinated effects is widely made, it is
valuable to recognize that this distinction is not as sharp as often supposed. For example, it blurs
when one considers “conscious parallelism” or tacit collusion, which as an economic matter
looks like coordinated behavior but in which each firm acts unilaterally and in its own economic
interests. Another possible way to think about the respective unilateral-effects and coordinatedeffects inquiries is to say that the first asks whether the post-merger entity will have gained
power profitably to set price and output regardless of what its rivals would do in response (within
the bounds of supplier rationality) and the second asks whether a merger will increase the risk
that firms in the market will act in concert to harm competition.
3. Efficiencies Analysis. If the analysis of market shares and other market characteristics
demonstrates that a proposed merger will not give rise to a significant competitive problem, one
can conclude that the merger will not harm competition and consumers. But if a significant
competitive problem is predicted by the preceding stages of analysis, then one must examine
efficiencies and conduct another stage of review to predict correctly whether a proposed merger
will, on balance, benefit or harm consumers. Simply put, a merger that is expected to give the
merging parties the ability to raise prices profitably might nonetheless lead to lower prices or at
least to greater social welfare if the merger gives rise to sufficient cost savings of the right sort.
These cost savings are referred to as efficiencies.29

27

Merger Guidelines at __. A recent example of a unilateral effects case is U.S. v. Oracle Corp., 2004 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 18063 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2004).

28

Merger Guidelines at __. A recent example of a coordinated effects case is FTC v. Arch Coal Inc., 2004
U.S. Dist. Lexis 15996 (D.D.C., Aug. 16, 2004).

29

The Merger Guidelines describe the process as follows:
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We observe in passing that the agencies give the majority of mergers the benefit of the
doubt when it comes to efficiencies. That is, the agencies tend not to challenge mergers unless
they predict anticompetitive effects above some threshold level. This approach can be
rationalized by the implicit assumption that any merger tends to generate some efficiencies,
perhaps by combining complementary assets, by rationalizing operations, or by allowing the
market for corporate control to discipline poor managers. But we also observe that, in cases
where agencies predict a merger will give rise to significant adverse competitive effects, the
courts rarely, if ever, allow the merger on the grounds of offsetting efficiencies. Efficiencies thus
become a factor mostly when a merger might cause modest competitive harm and where the case
is close.
4. Remedy Design. Several public policy responses are available if analysis indicates that
the effect of a merger in its proposed form may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend
to create a monopoly. One, of course, is simply to block the transaction. Often, however, less
drastic steps are available that can allow a modified version of the transaction to take place.
These steps include the divestiture of assets where competitive overlaps are particularly
significant, the mandatory licensing of intellectual property to other firms to allow them to
compete more effectively with the merging parties, and limitations on the merged firm’s conduct
(e.g., a requirement to offer the same prices to all customers to prevent the merged firm from
targeting customers whose only practical options were the two merging suppliers). In theory,
such remedies allow the realization of efficiencies while averting the harms that might otherwise
arise from the loss of competition—either static price competition or dynamic innovation
competition—between the two merging suppliers.
As this brief description illustrates, the conventional approach to merger review is
“static” nature. By “static” we mean it takes a short- term perspective focused on products and
markets as they exist at the time of (or within a limited time frame after) a proposed merger and

“The Agency will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and
magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market. To
make the requisite determination, the Agency considers whether cognizable efficiencies likely
would be sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market,
e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.” [Section 4, internal footnote omitted.]

12

predicts the likely, short-run impact on prices and outputs of those goods as the level of
competition changes with the merger. Dynamic considerations, such as R&D, although not
altogether absent, play relative little role.30 This lack of a dynamic approach may cause merger
review to miss forms of competition that are not reflected in the structure of current product
markets and to miss effects on consumers other than those reflected in short-run price and output
levels.
II.

How Innovation Complicates Merger Enforcement

The conventional paradigm and the issues for merger review change substantially in two broad
ways when technological innovation is taken into account. The first way is that innovation can
dramatically affect the relationship between the pre-merger marketplace and what is likely to
happen if the proposed merger is consummated. That is, technological change can
fundamentally alter the nature of the appropriate analysis even if one focuses on traditional,
product-market performance measures, such as static pricing efficiency. For example, market
shares are often used as an indicator of market power. But in theory at least, significant
innovation may lead to the rapid displacement of a supplier that, by traditional measures such as
current market share, appears to be dominant. We will refer to this effect of innovation on
merger analysis as the “innovation impact” effect.
The second way in which innovation can fundamentally affect merger policy is that
innovation can itself be an important dimension of market performance that is potentially
affected by a merger. That is, through its effects on innovation, a merger can generate
considerable efficiency and consumer-welfare effects even apart from any direct effects on shortrun product-market competition. Merging parties frequently assert that their transaction will
allow them to engage in greater innovation, while antitrust enforcers may object to a transaction
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Innovation considerations were raised in some early non-merger cases. United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Amer., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) recognized the effects of market power on innovation, although
innovation concerns did not play a significant role in the decision. Innovation played a more central role in
United States v. Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1969), in which the
court found that the leading American automobile manufacturers had engaged in a conspiracy "to eliminate
competition in the research, development, manufacture and installation of motor vehicle air pollution
control equipment . . . " in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (aff'd in part and appeal dismissed in
part, 397 U.S. 248 [1970]).
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on the grounds that it will lead to a loss of competition that would otherwise spur innovation. To
assess fully the impact of a merger on market performance, merger authorities and courts must
examine how a proposed transaction changes market participants’ incentives and abilities to
undertake investments in innovation. We will refer to this effect of innovation on merger policy
as the “innovation incentives” effect.
To examine the innovation incentives effect, one asks how the change in market structure
and competition brought about by a merger will likely affect consumer welfare through effects on
the pace or nature of innovation that might reduce costs or bring new products to market. To
examine the innovation impact effect, the situation is reversed. It refers not to how market
structure will affect innovation but to how innovation will affect the evolution of market
structure and competition. Innovation is a force that could make static measures of market
structure unreliable or irrelevant, and the effects of innovation may be highly relevant to whether
a merger should be challenged and to the kind of remedy antitrust authorities choose to adopt.
The two ways that innovation may factor into merger analysis have important policy
implications. To the extent that innovation is itself a significant objective, antitrust agencies
need to understand the relationship between market structure and innovation in a given case with
sufficient depth to distinguish legitimate from merely opportunistic claims that the merger will
benefit, or at least not harm, innovation incentives. Similarly, the fact that innovation may affect
the post-merger marketplace in ways that are hard to predict challenges merger authorities to
distinguish mere claims by the merging parties that they face potential, innovation-based
competition from situations in which such potential entry really exists.
Finally, the importance of innovation incentives raises the question of whether the
enforcement guidelines and precedent aimed at promoting conventional competitive goals of low
prices and high output are consistent with promoting the goal of efficient innovation.31 To the
extent that tension exists between innovation and the static economic goals of merger policy,
merger enforcement must develop a framework for deciding how to make trade-offs between
those objectives.

31

Of course, from a long-run perspective, promoting innovation and promoting low, quality-adjusted prices
are largely the same objective. The distinction we draw in the text can be viewed as one between static
pricing efficiency and dynamic pricing efficiency.
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In the following sections we identify particular challenges—either entirely new issues or
especially strong instances of issues that arise more broadly—created by the presence of
significant innovation. We address both the innovation impact effect and the innovation
incentive effect. Before addressing how innovation relates to each step of conventional merger
analysis, however, we examine a critical, underlying question: does antitrust law’s basic premise
that consumer welfare increases with competition apply when innovation rather than short-run
price level is the important measure of market performance? If that presumption changes in the
context of technological innovation, so too do the importance and method of defining markets,
analyzing likely competitive effects of a transaction, and other aspects of the merger review
framework that the Guidelines have created.
III.

The Concentration-Competition-Welfare Presumption

As summarized above, in conventional merger review enforcement officials take an increase in
concentration in the relevant markets as a proxy for a decrease in competition that—if large
enough—will lead to a significant increase in the prices faced by consumers.32 Broken down
somewhat more finely, the courts presume that higher concentration leads to less competition and
that less competition leads to lower levels of consumer welfare and efficiency; a chain of
reasoning sometimes referred to as the “concentration-competition-welfare presumption.”
Absent a presumption that changes in concentration lead to changes in consumer welfare,
the traditional rationale for market definition and approaches that depend on it weakens. And, as
we will now discuss, there are difficult issues concerning such a presumption in the context of
technological innovation. The discussion of this section is important both for understanding
what role market definition should play in the incorporation of innovation considerations into
merger policy and for knowing what, if any, presumptions the enforcement agencies should apply
to the relationship between mergers and innovation.

32

For the most part, economic theory and antitrust policy have long favored more competition over less for
the purpose of lowering prices, expanding output, and making consumers better off. There are, however,
limited exceptions to this view. For example, certain industries in which per-unit cost declines as output
increases to the point that it is most efficient to have just one firm producing all output in a given market
have come to be known as natural monopolies. Historically, telecommunications networks were a leading
example, and public policy actually served to limit entry. That view has since changed. For instance, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. Sections 151 et seq, seeks to promote competitive entry.
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A.

The Effects of Innovation on the Traditional Concentration-CompetitionWelfare Presumption

Although subject to some well-placed criticism, the concentration-competition-welfare
presumption is on fairly sound footing for traditional, static, price and output concerns, whether
one is talking about current markets or is looking ahead at the relationship between future
competition and future welfare as measured by price and output. However, the linkage between
current concentration and future competition and welfare may be weak in some circumstances,
notably when there is significant ongoing innovation. This is so because innovation may be
unrelated to the concentration of current sales, may make future market structures hard to predict,
or may alter products in ways that create consumer benefits that offset any harmful changes to
price and output over time. In other words, in markets in which innovation is significant, the
traditional concentration-competition relationship is on a weaker or more nuanced empirical and
theoretical footing than otherwise.
Consider first the traditional presumption concerning short-run price or output
competition. Legally, a rebuttable presumption exists that a high resulting level of concentration
indicates a competitive problem with a proposed merger.33 No general theorem of economics
proves that higher concentration leads to higher prices or lower output. However, absent
innovation, one can expect this relationship for several reasons. First, many (but not all) formal
economic models of markets likely to attract merger scrutiny (i.e., those markets in which only a
few firms compete) indicate that equilibrium output falls and equilibrium prices rise as the
number of firms declines. This situation is especially true in markets in which suppliers cannot
quickly and easily adjust their output levels as they vie to take the market share of the exiting
firm, or where firms supply differentiated products and product repositioning is difficult.
Empirically, substantial evidence supports the theoretical correlation of prices and market
concentration.34 And the presumption that increased competition leads to increased consumer
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United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
In addition, the Department of Justice and the FTC often take increases in concentration as a reason to be
concerned about a merger when deciding whether to pursue an enforcement action. See Merger Guidelines,
Section 1.5.
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See, e.g., Schmalensee, Richard (1989) “Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance,” in Handbook
of Industrial Organization, Vol. II, Schmalensee and Willig (ed.s), Amsterdam: North Holland.
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welfare or greater efficiency is also generally on sound footing.35 Consumers in the U.S. have
experienced the benefits of reduced concentration and increased competition in markets such as
long-distance and wireless telephone services, air travel, and pharmaceuticals.
Although the presumption is on generally firm footing, there is also need for caution. In
other models and under specified conditions, increased concentration may not lead to higher
quality-adjusted prices and entry may not lead to lower quality-adjusted prices. To generate
sensible predictions of the effects of a merger, the measurement and analysis of market shares
should be tied to a coherent theory of competitive effects that fits the facts of the industry under
consideration.36 Put another way, the analysis of market shares can most confidently be used to
predict adverse competitive effects of a merger when one has an empirically supported theory
that market shares are informative of competitive conditions and that an increase in concentration
will harm competition and consumers.
Another reason that, even absent significant innovation, market share data should be
interpreted with caution is that merger enforcement is forward looking; the agencies predict the
likely effects of a transaction. Conventional market share measures, however, are backwardlooking. This is one important reason why high market share is not, in itself, sufficient to
establish market power. Most market share measures reflect where firms were in terms of
market position (e.g., shares of installed base), or where they are (e.g., shares of sales to
customers who are new to the industry), but not necessarily where they are going.37
Innovation complicates the interpretation of market share data because this potential
shortcoming is particularly critical in industries characterized by ongoing innovation and
technological change. Innovation may render market shares unstable and hard to predict.
Indeed, innovation raises the fundamental question of whether current product-market shares are
meaningful predictors of future competitive conditions in a dynamic industry and thus are
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There are some exceptions. Even in static settings, for instance, perfect competition does not attain the first
best in the presence of externalities, and distortions due to concentration may in some cases offset those due
to externalities.
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Under the process described by the Merger Guidelines, “Market shares will be calculated using the best
indicator of firms’ future competitive significance.” Merger Guidelines, Section 1.41.
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Of course, in some circumstances, firms current positions are good predictors of their future positions and
past positions can shed light on the extent of installed-base or related advantages.
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relevant to the prediction of the price and output effects of a merger. If a market is in constant
turmoil because of dramatic innovation, the argument goes, what does one learn from current
product sales? If the merged firms would have a dominant market share immediately postmerger, another firm in the market could produce the next great new advance and leave the
merged entity behind.38 Even in the conventional static setting, a strong consensus exists among
economists that rival suppliers’ capacity to enter and expand in a market must be considered in
addition to current market share data. Market shares may be altogether irrelevant in some cases
because there may be markets in which innovation is so characteristic and sustained that firms
compete not just for increments of market share but for markets as a whole. The Merger
Guidelines accordingly recognize that, in changing markets, current market share may be an
inaccurate measure of a firm’s forward-looking competitive significance.39 In sum, a firm's
monopoly today may say little about the firm's prospects one, two, or five years from now, and
the greater the level and rate of innovation in an industry, the less reliable a predictor of future
events market share becomes.
Similar issues arise with respect to the assessment of potential competition. In assessing
concentration, the conventional focus is on actual rather than potential competitors, the latter of
which are included in the market only when certain conditions of imminence and probability are
met. But when innovation is important, identifying potentialinnovation and product -market
competitors may be particularly critical to understanding competition and the welfare effects of
transactions. Identifying potential competitors can be difficult in the best of situations and
competitive potentiality in the innovation context often hinges on the possession of certain skills
and information assets that can be particularly hard to identify and measure. In the other
direction, however, the existence of ongoing innovation efforts can render claims of potential
product-market competition more readily verifiable because a firm that has made substantial
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The flip side is that a merger may have substantial effects on competition even if the post-merger productmarket share is permissible within the enforcement guidelines. If the merger brings together two imminent
technologies that otherwise would have competed, then consumers lose out on rivalry that otherwise would
have come to exist absent the merger.

39

Merger Guidelines, Section 1.521. The extent to which the agencies are willing to adopt forward-looking
views of competition is the subject of some debate.
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investments in R&D aimed at a specific product is more likely to enter the market for that
product than is a firm that has the relevant technological capabilities but has invested nothing.
The above discussion shows that it is imperative that merger enforcement agencies look
beyond current market share data in markets characterized by innovation. More fundamentally,
though, market-share data are relevant in conventional merger review only because of the
concentration-competition-welfare presumption. The arguments above show that in the best of
circumstances that presumption needs to be applied with caution, especially so in cases where
innovation is an issue. There is also a deeper question; one that lies at the heart of the
“Schumpeterian” critique discussed above: is the concentration-competition-welfare presumption
valid when one is talking about the dynamic effects of, and on, innovation. It is to that question
we now turn.
B.

The Concentration-Competition-Welfare Presumption for Innovation

Is concentration a reliable basis for predicting the strength of innovation competition? Even if
the market in which innovation takes place can be well defined, the question arises of how
changes in market structure will affect the performance of that market. The use of market-share
data to predict a merger’s likely effects on innovation raises two fundamental issues. The first is
how to measure concentration. Should one consider concentration of product sales or
concentration of R&D capabilities? Firms conduct R&D with an eye toward the future. Thus,
one can raise serious doubts about the value of current product-market sales as indices of the
state of innovation-based competition.40 Concentration of R&D capabilities may thus provide a
better measure. The second issue is how to treat potential competition. The threat of entry or
potential competition may be a stronger spur to innovation efforts than to lowering current prices
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See, e.g., Kamien, Morton I., and Nancy Schwartz (1972) “Timing of Innovations under Rivalry.”
Econometrica 40: 43-60, at 20, (“concentration reflects the current sellers of a product and may be quite
unrelated to the extent of actual and potential rivalry in innovating new products”.) See also, Evans and
Schmalensee (2002, supra note ___, at 16-18) and Hartman, Teece, Mitchell, and Jorde (1993, supra note
85, at 322-3). However, current concentration can be related to innovation in some circumstances. In the
case of process innovations that are used solely by the innovators in their own production, for example,
firms with higher market shares have greater innovation incentives.
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and increasing current output.41 Indeed, even R&D programs that never succeed in developing
new products or processes may nonetheless benefit consumers by stimulating potential rivals to
innovate.
Although the above considerations are important, they are similar to those just discussed
in the context of market definition.42 A deeper issue is that, even if appropriate market share
measures are found and the transaction truly would increase market concentration in a sustained
way, that concentration may affect innovation incentives differently from how it affects static
economic variables like price and output. The idea that concentration will not harm and in fact
may help innovation is central to the Schumpeterians’ claims that merger enforcement should
tread cautiously in the name of innovation. The discussion that follows examines the relevant
economic evidence and its implications.
1. The Concentration-R&D Relationship
A central tenet of merger policy is that markets characterized by atomistic competition generally
promote consumer welfare better than do concentrated markets. The presumption that increased
benefits come from an increased number of competitors is weaker, however, when the policy
goal is not just lowering prices toward more efficient levels for a given set of goods produced
using a fixed set of technologies but also promoting efficient innovative activity by firms over
time. Economic theory has long raised questions about the degree to which increased productmarket competition or an increase in the number of firms undertaking R&D leads to an increase
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Under the theory of limit pricing, incumbent firms set low prices today to deter future entry. In many
circumstances, however, the threat entry will have little effect on pre-entry prices, and potential competition
plays a relatively small role in price setting. This relationship holds when: (a) pre-entry prices do not signal
otherwise-unknown information about incumbents to potential entrants, and (b) incumbent suppliers can
rapidly change their prices in response to entry if and when it occurs. (For additional discussion of limit
pricing, see Section V below.) In contrast, shifting R&D programs may be a slow process that takes time to
bear fruit. Hence, incumbents may increase their R&D investments in anticipation of entry.
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We also return to the issue of potential competition in Section V below.
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in overall R&D investment.43 Both the theoretical and empirical bases for predicting that an
increase in concentration will lead to less innovation are mixed.
The idea that the economic conditions that maximize innovation over time may not be the
same conditions that allocate resources efficiently in the short run was suggested over fifty years
ago by Joseph Schumpeter, who wrote that, for purposes of promoting economic welfare,
“perfect competition is not only impossible but inferior, and has no title to being set up as the
model of ideal efficiency.”44 Schumpeter’s argument that most technological innovation would
come from large corporations with market power and organized R&D operations implied that the
ideal of competition under antitrust law could have substantial social costs over time.45
Although Schumpeter wrote mostly about large firms, their associated economies of scale
for R&D, and their ability to attract capital and talented scientists, his critique of perfect
competition and discussion of the benefits of market power suggest that his ideal innovators were
not only large but dominant as well. Early theoretical explorations of Schumpeter’s claim found
that when the polar cases of monopoly and perfect competition were compared, the latter
provided stronger incentives for cost-reducing innovations.46 Subsequent theoretical research has
shown that, depending on various conditions, either monopoly power or competition may lead to
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For example, in their 1975 survey of work on innovation and market structure, Kamien and Schwartz stated
that “Few, if any, economists maintain that perfect competition efficiently allocates resources for technical
advance.” (Kamien, Morton I., and Nancy L. Schwartz (1975) “Market Structure and Innovation: A
Survey.” Journal of Economic Literature, XIII: 1–37, at 2.) Today, economists have a deeper appreciation
for licensing and other forms of innovation diffusion, so there might be less agreement with such a sweeping
statement because multiple interpretations of what is meant by perfect competition are possible in this
context.
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Schumpeter, supra note ___, at 106.
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Of course, the competitive ideal of antitrust policy has evolved over time. When Schumpeter was writing,
the ideal was rivalry among small, atomized economic actors. Any cooperation or concentration deviating
from that standard was inherently suspect. The Chicago School revolution did much to improve
understanding of why different market structures might result in different contexts and thereby reduced rigid
adherence to the perfectly competitive model. Because of its benefits for allocative efficiency, competition
nonetheless remained the touchstone of antitrust policy.
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Fellner, William (1951) “The Influence of Market Structure on Technological Progress,” Quarterly Journal
or Economics 65: 556-577, and Arrow (1962), supra note 90.
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greater total innovation.47 And other research suggests that oligopoly—competition among a few
firms—is the market structure most conducive to development of new products and processes.48
There is an extensive academic literature modeling market structure and innovation, but
much of the research on market structure and innovation has a straightforward intuition behind
it.49 There are two opposing sets of forces shaping the relationship between market structure and
innovation. One, a firm facing strong product-market rivalry has an incentive to develop new
products and processes that will help it improve or defend its market position. Similarly, a firm
engaged in a race with several others to develop a new patentable technology will be under
pressure to act quickly to win the race. At the other pole of market structure, Sir John Hicks
famously remarked that“[the] best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.” 50 Considerable
anecdotal evidence suggests that competition drives organizations to be more innovative than do
protected monopoly positions. Further, a monopolist may bring product innovations slower to
market than would a competitor because the monopolist is concerned about cannibalizing its
existing business.51 Therefore, a monopolist might be an inferior innovator from the perspective
of consumers.52
There are also forces affecting the relationship between market structure and innovation
that favor market power over competition. The possibility of sudden and sweeping entry,
combined with large up-front investment demands, can necessitate high initial returns to allow
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Scherer, Frederick M. (1992) “Schumpeter and Plausible Capitalism,” Journal of Economic Literature
30:1416-1433.
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Scherer, Frederick M. (1967) “Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and Engineers.”
American Economic Review, 57: 524-531, Scherer, Frederick M. (1967) “Research and Development
Resource Allocation Under Rivalry,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 81:359-394, Kamien and Schwartz
(1972), supra note 40, and Kamien, Morton I., and Nancy Schwartz (1976) “On the Degree of Rivalry for
Maximum Innovative Activity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 245-260.
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See Scherer (1992), supra note 47, and Reinganum, Jennifer F. (1989) “The Timing of Innovation:
Research, Development, and Diffusion,” in Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. I, Schmalensee and
Willig (eds.), Amsterdam: North Holland.
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It should be observed that, in terms of efficiency, the social value of innovation is the incremental
improvement that it represents over the existing technology. Hence, the fact that a monopolist is concerned
with cannibalization is not entirely indicative of an efficiency problem.
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costs to be recouped before the next innovator supplants the incumbent investor. A firm with a
large market share and significant market power may better amortize the fixed costs of R&D and
reap a high percentage of the benefits of R&D. Large, established firms might be particularly
adept at marshaling resources for incremental innovation or for helping to bring a small firm’s
invention to market. Suppliers with many product-market rivals may have less ability to
appropriate the returns from innovation that make the investment in innovation worthwhile,
either because their innovations are readily copied or invented around by rivals or because
atomistic competitors lack the other assets needed to exploit their innovations fully (e.g., a firm
with a small share of the product market may not amortize its cost-reducing innovation over
many units of output). Similarly, if many firms are racing to obtain a patent, each firm may
conclude that its chances of winning the race are sufficiently small that it is not profitable to
invest as much in R&D as it would without so many competitors.
Strong intellectual property rights can reduce some of the risks from innovation in
competitive markets, specifically those associated with rapid imitation. And licensing may make
it possible and profitable to for an innovator to benefit from the use of its intellectual property
throughout an industry with many firms. However, even in the presence of strong intellectual
property rights, other firms may develop similar or better advances and may circumvent an
innovator’s initial patent. These risks exist for competitive firms and product-market
monopolists alike. But the risk that another firm will respond to an innovation with an
innovation of its own may grow with the number of firms competing in the relevant product
market, at least initially.
The theoretical discussion above shows that, although economic intuition suggests an
overarching presumption that innovation will be greatest for firms facing competitive pressures
and the prospects of supracompetitive returns to innovation, it is also clear that, depending on
assumptions, the theoretical balance could swing toward either a greater number of competitors
or monopoly in a given case.
Empirical data do not resolve the ambiguous theoretical relationship between competition
and innovation. Many analyses supported the Schumpeterian view by finding a positive

23

correlation between market concentration and R&D investment.53 Other analyses, however,
found data to show concentration to have a negative effect on innovation.54 An early and
influential study by F. M. Scherer indicated that both could be correct over a sufficiently large
range of market structures because the relationship between innovation and concentration is
nonlinear. His study, which corroborated the theoretical intuition discussed above, found the
relationship between market structure and innovation to follow an inverted-U pattern: innovation
is observed to be low at high levels of competition, reach its peak at intermediate levels of
oligopoly (where the four leading firms control roughly half the market), and then fall off as
market structure approaches monopoly.55 Several studies replicated and confirmed Scherer’s
results.56
Later work, however, raised serious doubts about these findings and identified several
reasons why one should be cautious in the interpretation of the empirical literature. First,
questions surround the statistical significance of the parameter estimates leading to a U-shaped
relationship and whether they are, in fact, picking up the effects of omitted variables such as
technological opportunity.57 Second, extreme care must be taken in interpreting cross-sectional
studies because the causality between market structure and innovation rates can run in both
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directions.58 One detailed analysis of British data found that the higher profit expectations in
concentrated markets increased innovative activity but that, over time, innovation reduced
concentration levels in the sample industries.59 Many empirical studies fail to account for the
fact that market structure itself might be affected by the perceived possibilities for innovation and
that market structure might therefore be a result, rather than a cause, of innovation incentives.
The literature addressing how market structure affects innovation (and vice versa) in the end
reveals an ambiguous relationship in which factors unrelated to competition play an important
role. In their review of the empirical literature, Cohen and Levin concluded that “[t]ogether,
these results leave little support for the view that industrial concentration is an independent,
significant, and important determinant of innovative behavior and performance.” 60
The theory and data that support the systematic presumption in favor of increased
competition for purposes of static pricing and output efficiency thus have no analog when it
comes to understanding the optimal conditions for innovation. By the same token, it should be
observed that Schumpeterian claims that merger policy should favor increased concentration as a
means of promoting innovation equally lack firm empirical grounding. Meaningful general
presumptions have not been identified: innovation is affected by a variety of market factors other
than concentration (as well as variables related to a firm’s regulatory status, products, and
technologies). Although more rivals rather than fewer will often remain the correct decision in a
particular case, enforcement authorities cannot confidently presume as a matter of economic
theory or experience that more competitors are beneficial or that market power is detrimental for
R&D, except in the limited case of merger to monopoly where the evidence supports a moderate
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presumption of harm. Importantly, however, nor can merger authorities presume with any
confidence that increased concentration, firm size, or market power will be beneficial for R&D.
Where do the above results leave merger authorities? Although the available data and
theory show it is impossible to make definitive general statements about the linkage between
market structure and innovation, they also show that one can often make reasonable predictions
about the effects of specific transactions within a particular industry based on a fact-intensive
investigation into the incentives and capabilities of actual and potential innovators. We think
such fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiries are the better course than the systematic retreat from
enforcement in dynamic settings for which the “Schumpeterian” school argues.
2. The R&D-Consumer Welfare Relationship
Once an agency makes a prediction about a merger's likely effect on innovation, an issue arises
that does not come up in the analysis of conventional, static concerns. Although it is extremely
counterintuitive to many people, a large body of economics literature has established theoretical
reasons why profit-maximizing firms may invest more in R&D than is socially efficient.61 An
important implication is that the social welfare effects of an innovation-reducing merger may be
positive. Patent races are one situation in which firms may invest excessive amounts of R&D in
order to innovate quickly. In a race to obtain a pharmaceutical patent, for example, preempting
rivals by a day may allow a pharmaceutical firm to obtain intellectual property rights whose value
far exceeds the social benefits of having the patented drug available one day sooner.62 Society
would have done better if the duplicative R&D resources were invested elsewhere and the
innovation obtained a day later. In other situations, an innovation may allow a supplier to
increase its share of the economic pie without increasing the total pie (e.g., a product or database
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innovation may facilitate price discrimination having these effects). Such an innovation might
have private value for the innovator but no overall social value.63
The theoretical possibility of excessive private incentives notwithstanding, as an
empirical matter private incentives to invest in R&D typically are too low.64 This situation arises
because private firms are generally unable to appropriate fully the benefits that their R&D
generates for the economy.65 Of course, “typically” is not synonymous with “always.” Under
specific conditions, firms can have socially excessive innovation incentives, and one can
examine any particular market to determine if those conditions are present.
Whether enforcement authorities would want to act when such conditions for
overinvestment in innovation hold, however, raises the possible tension between consumer
welfare and social welfare when merger policy focuses on innovation rather than static
competition. This is so because consumers almost always benefit from increased R&D. Even in
patent race models, it is possible that consumers would be better off if firms invested still more
and thus brought the fruits of innovation to the market even faster.66 We discuss the possible
trade-off from allowing mergers that reduce inefficient innovation in the efficiencies section
below.
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In the end, we conclude from the economic evidence that the concentration-competitionwelfare presumption is—at present—weak for the innovation effects of mergers. One exception
is merger to monopoly, which can leave a firm facing little pressure to race to innovate and
diminished incentives to engage in follow-on innovations that could cannibalize revenues from
the firm’s existing products combine. Moreover, in the face of potential entry, such a firm is
more like to attain intellectual property rights solely to block potential rivals from attaining them,
rather than to bring improved products to market. In contrast, with two or more incumbents,
there is a free-rider problem with respect to entry deterrence, and thus entry deterrence of this
sort is less likely. Further—and moving beyond a traditional competitive analysis—a firm that
lacks rivals against which to benchmark itself may be a less efficient innovator. For these
reasons, we believe that economic analysis supports a presumption of harm to innovation in the
case of merger to monopoly.67
It is important to recognize that the general lack of a presumption in one direction does
not imply a presumption in the opposite direction. Although the evidence does not support a
general claim that consolidation reduces innovation, it also does not support the opposite
presumption thatconsolidation will increase innovation. Hence, the lack of a presumptive link
between market structure and innovation (outside of the monopoly context) undermines not just
the conventional presumption in merger cases but also the “Schumpeterian” argument against
merger enforcement where innovation is at stake.
Our analysis therefore suggests that the claim for systematic laissez faire in
technologically dynamic markets is not soundly grounded in economics. It will not always or
even often be true that unchecked consolidation will produce the conditions fostering the intense
investment in new technology that leads to sequential competition “for the market,” as the
“Schumpeterians” sometimes argue.68 Although the current product-market shares of most firms
might well be largely irrelevant to merger enforcement in such cases, it would be a mistake to
think the irrelevance of current market shares inexorably leads to permissive merger policy.
Indeed, a merger policy designed to foster and protect dynamic competition might appear fairly
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restrictive when viewed through the lens of conventional merger analysis. For instance, the
Schumpeterian approach might instead imply that the current dominant firm should be allowed to
merge with essentially no other firm because any other firm might be the next successful rival.
Similarly, it might be socially optimal to block a merger between two firms that currently had no
product-market sales because each was involved in R&D that might make it the next market
winner. The key point is that, to understand a proposed merger’s potential effects on
Schumpeterian competition, one would need to ask which firms have the potential to engage in
innovation that could challenge the position of the dominant firm and then have a framework for
understanding how the merger would affect the incentives and abilities of those firms to engage
in development and deployment of new technology.
In summary, consolidation can cause harm depending on the particular facts of the case,
and we think those facts should therefore become central to the merger analysis. When the
government can marshal evidence of harm to innovation, we think the better policy is to give the
government the opportunity to present that evidence in an enforcement case, not to free merging
parties at the outset from having to rebut the evidence. We conclude that in mergers short of
monopoly, the government should have no presumption of harm to innovation and should bear
the initial burden of proving harm that the defendant would then have to rebut. In mergers to
monopoly, we think that there should be a presumption of harm and that defendants should carry
the initial burden of rebutting that presumption with evidence that there would be no reduction in
innovation from the merger or that any reduction would bring with it compensating efficiencies.
This section has tried to demonstrate an important, overarching fact: the market structures
that promote innovation need not align with the market structures that systematically promote
efficient, short-run price and output levels. Consequently, conventional presumptions and
conventional ways of making predictions about a transaction’s welfare effects may need
rethinking where technological change is an important market feature. We turn next to how
specific steps in the current enforcement framework affect, and may be affected by, technological
change. We begin with market definition, the exercise that lies at the heart of the traditional
merger review process.
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IV.

Market Definition

Even in the absence of innovation, there are two broad concerns about the importance that is
attached to market definition in merger review. First, there is a question of whether market
definition is, in fact, necessary to a sound analysis of the consumer-welfare and efficiency effects
of a merger. Second, there are concerns that the mechanics of formal market definition may
actually be an obstacle to good analysis in some instances. Innovation heightens these two
concerns both with respect to static analyses of price and output effects and to dynamic analyses
of investment and innovation.
In order to understand the concerns about merger policy’s emphasis on defining markets,
it is useful to describe in more detail the mechanics of market definition. There is a longstanding principle by which economists define the product scope of a market: two goods or
services are in the same relevant market if and only if consumers view them as sufficiently close
substitutes.69 A similar logic is used for geographic scope. When are substitutes sufficiently
close that they should be included in the same market? To some extent, chocolates compete with
automobiles for consumers’ dollars, but one should not conclude that chocolates and automobiles
are in the same product market. To give more precision to the concept of sufficiently close
substitutes, economists undertaking market delineation exercises often conduct the so-called
hypothetical monopolist test. This test asks whether a hypothetical, profit-maximizing
monopolist over a group of products in a given area could profitably raise prices above a
specified level by a small but significant amount for a sustained period of time.70 The group of
products considered in the test comprises a candidate relevant market. The actual relevant market
is the smallest set of products the monopolist would need to control in order to raise prices
profitably.71
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A price increase will raise a hypothetical monopolist’s profits unless unit sales volume
falls sufficiently to offset the higher price received for the units sold.72 Thus, the hypothetical
monopolist test indicates that a set of products or a geographical area constitutes a relevant
market if the hypothetical monopolist could make a small but significant and non-transitory
increase in price without causing enough consumers to switch to substitute goods so that the
price increase becomes unprofitable.
The hypothetical monopolist test is used both by enforcement agencies and by the courts
that review agency actions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for example,
reversed the FTC’s injunction of a merger between two hospitals in a single town on the grounds
that the FTC had failed to show that its narrow definition of the relevant market could satisfy the
hypothetical monopolist test.73
A. Implications of Innovation for the Use of Market Definition to Predict the
Static Price Effects of a Merger
Consider first the role of market definition in the analysis of traditional, static price and output
effects. Clearly, one cannot predict the competitive effects of a merger without developing some
sense of the competitors and the constraints that they apply to the merging parties’ behavior. It is
important to know whether—prior to the merger—rivalry between the merging parties was
critical in driving them to serve consumer interests. Consequently, the need for market
definition, broadly conceived, is not in doubt. What is in doubt is the need to define bright-line
boundaries through application of a formal algorithm that is applied separately from the analysis
of competitive effects.
Indeed, the very question asked by the hypothetical monopolist test raises issues about
this separation. Under the Merger Guidelines’ approach, the answer to the following question
provides the basis of market definition: Would a hypothetical monopolist with control and
ownership of a particular set of products be able to raise price profitably in a significant way,
holding the prices of other products constant? But why not make predictions about what actual
suppliers would do rather than focus on a hypothetical monopolist? Specifically, why not ask
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directly whether the merging parties would find it profitable to raise price by a significant amount
post merger? That is the question whose answer matters for consumer welfare.74 If one
possesses the answer to that question, then the answer to the hypothetical monopolist question is
completely superfluous.
There is emerging recognition that a proper economic analysis of a merger’s effects does
not require formal definition of bright-line boundaries. Proponents of the view that market
definition may be superfluous include former chief economists of both principal U.S. antitrust
agencies. For example, Professor Jonathan Baker, a former Director of the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission’s Bureau of Economics, observed:
Indeed, if a merger can be shown to harm competition directly, antitrust should
not need to spend much effort on market definition … . [I]f the likely harm to
competition from a merger can be demonstrated directly, there exists a market
where harm will occur, but there is little need to specify the market’s precise
boundaries.75
Similarly, Professor Janusz Ordover, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic
Analysis at the Department of Justice, wrote:
From the perspective of economic theory, antitrust law’s preoccupation with
market definition has always seemed somewhat peculiar. Arguments for and
against a merger that turn upon distinctions between broad and narrow market
definitions are, to an economic purist, an inadequate substitute for, and a diversion
from, sound direct assessment of a merger’s effect.76
Numerous courts and agencies have also made the point that market definition is an
indirect way of showing a merger’s effects that should not stand in the way of considering direct
evidence of competitive harm, although generally in antitrust contexts outside of merger review.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that “[i]f a
plaintiff can show that a defendant’s conduct exerted an actual adverse effect on competition . . .
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this arguably is more direct evidence of market power than calculations of elusive market share
figures.”77 The Supreme Court held in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists that
[s]ince the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to
determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition, ‘proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output’
can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is ‘but a surrogate
for detrimental effects.’78
If the formalities of market definition can be skipped in favor of direct analysis of harm in
monopolization and collusion cases, there is no reason the same should not hold true for merger
analysis where the issue—likely competitive harm—is similar. To be sure, merger analysis is
often more prospective and predictive than other kind of antitrust cases where the conduct at
issue frequently has been ongoing for some time. But that simply means direct effects may be
easier to show in non-merger cases and not that direct evidence of market power shouldn’t have
the same priority in merger cases where such evidence is available.
Unfortunately, the conventional separation of market definition from the analysis of
actual competitive effects in merger analysis leads to a convention in which the plaintiff’s burden
to establish boundaries of relevant markets is often interpreted as an obligation to establish “the”
bright-line boundary. Hence, some courts might dismiss or discount the plaintiff’s case for being
unable to establish a clear market boundary. Indeed, the Justice Department lost its bid to block
the merger between Oracle and PeopleSoft in large part because the trial court found that the
Department failed to prove the product and geographic markets it had alleged in its complaint.79
Interestingly, the trial judge in Oracle was well aware that it could be “difficult to identify ‘clear
breaks in the chain of substitutes’ sufficient to justify bright-line market boundaries,” especially
in markets with similar but differentiated products.80 But the court’s recognition of the difficulty
of defining such clear market boundaries did not lead it to lessen the government’s burden of
proving a market definition that would support its unilateral effects theory of harm in the case.
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Similarly, in another recent case, the FTC lost its suit to enjoin Arch Coal’s acquisition of Triton
Coal because the district court found the Commission had not met its burden of proving that the
market should be defined to include 8800 Btu coal and to exclude 8400 Btu coal.81 Accordingly,
the court ruled that both should be included in the relevant market. But the boundaries of actual
competition may not be as sharp as the in-or-out approach the court took in Arch.
A more rational approach would recognize the inherent uncertainty and take it into
account.82 One way to do so would be to ask where the dividing line matters, allow the plaintiffs
and defendants to make their arguments about on which side of the critical line the “actual”
market boundary lies without a requirement of certainty, and then assess the potential
competitive harms in the light of the uncertainty the fuzzy market definition creates for
predicting that harm will occur. Plaintiffs would not be held to a standard of establishing a
unique, bright-line boundary with a high degree of certainty.83
The presence of significant innovation exacerbates the strains already present in market
definition because the characteristics of various suppliers’ differentiated products may constantly
shift in significant ways, making it especially hard to draw bright-line market boundaries with
certainty. Significant innovation also raises at least two new issues with respect to market
definition for an analysis of static pricing effects. First, some commentators have objected to the
nature of the price changes used in conducting the hypothetical monopolist test when there is
significant ongoing technological progress. Second, rapid innovation can make it difficult to
define relevant product markets because business executives and government officials alike may
not yet know what the future products will be.
Consider first the issue of the price changes used in conducting the hypothetical
monopolist test. Under American and European Union competition policy, a small but
significant price increase in the context of the hypothetical monopolist test is often taken to mean
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a price change in the range of 5 to 10 percent. 84 Several different criticisms have been made
regarding application of this approach to markets with rapid technological progress, where
quality-adjusted prices might fall by 20 percent or more annually.85
One critique is that a 5- or 10-percent price increase may be an inappropriate test because
it may either understate or overstate the merged firm’s market power when costs and qualityadjusted prices are routinely changing by much greater amounts.86 This criticism would be
appropriate if enforcement authorities took current prices as the baseline. For instance, if
innovation is driving costs down significantly, then merely holding prices constant at the premerger baseline could be indicative of the exercise of substantially increased market power
because profit margins would have in increased significantly. Conversely, in a market where
prices were rising on a nominal basis but costs were rising faster because innovation was leading
to higher-quality, but more-expensive-to-produce goods, a 10-percent price increase over the premerger baseline might be competitive pricing and reflect no market power at all. What is needed
is a careful analysis of what constitutes a real price increase in the face of cost and product
changes. Stated another way, what is needed is a comparison of alternative price paths,
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recognizing that prices might well have changed over time even in the absence of the merger
under examination. Without such a comparison, the hypothetical monopolist test can be applied
in ways that generate misleading conclusions.
A related criticism is that the hypothetical monopolist approach to defining market
boundaries conducts a test based on the assumption that other suppliers hold their prices constant
when such prices may in fact be falling. This criticism is somewhat misplaced; under the
hypothetical monopolist test, the prices of potential substitute products are assumed not to
change in response to a change in the monopolist’s price, but this assumption does not preclude
the possibility of technological progress as a driver of price changes over time. This criticism
and the one preceding it do, however, raise an important question: What baseline prices for the
hypothetical monopolist and other suppliers should be used in defining the product scope of a
market with rapid technological progress? Specifically, should one use current or future prices?
Because the concern of merger analysis is with post-merger market performance, we
believe that it is more appropriate to use projections of future prices. Of course, forming reliable
projections can sometimes be difficult, and this difficulty can be compounded by the fact that
innovation can itself be affected by the merger. Moreover, when technological progress is
ongoing, the scope of the product market may continue to change, so that multiple projections are
necessary. However, relying on current prices can lead to market definitions that are either too
narrow (when technological progress in substitute products is rapid) or too broad (when the
hypothetical monopolist’s product is subject to greater technological progress than are substitute
products).87
Put differently, the issue is that the agencies and the courts may not know which products
will be viable substitutes in the near future. Under the traditional approach to market definition,
the central aim, whether one uses the hypothetical monopolist test or some other algorithm, is to
identify existing products that are at present meaningful substitutes for one another from a
consumer’s perspective. When innovation is significant, the analysis may need to be much more
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forward-looking. Innovation may result in the creation of new products that compete in the
relevant market, or innovation may lower the costs of producing existing products that are, at
present, too expensive to be considered viable substitutes for the products of the merging parties.
The brevity of our discussion to this point should not be taken as a sign that the
difficulties of forming reliable projections are minor or readily dealt with. Conceptually, the
issues are straightforward and are compatible with the Merger Guidelines’ market definition
framework, as long as that framework is applied on a forward-looking basis. In practice, there
are two problems. First, actually projecting future substitution possibilities in a fast-changing
and highly uncertain environment is often difficult. Second, the agencies generally limit the
extent to which they take a forward-looking view.88 Their short-range perspective is in part a
reaction to practical difficulties but, as we discuss below in Part VI.D, the agencies generally
have not made use of well-established tools of decision theory that could provide a more
coherent approach for decision making under uncertainty and do a better job of taking possible,
future events into account. Although adopting these tools would benefit merger review in every
case, it is particularly important given the effect innovation can have on products and production
processes.
B. The Role of Market Definition in Predicting the Innovation Effects of a
Merger
The discussion above addresses how innovation can complicate market definition for purposes of
gauging a merger’s effects on price and output in a relevant product market. What about the use
of market definition to assess a merger’s effects on innovation itself? The purpose of defining
relevant markets is to identify the boundaries of competition in order to make predictions about
post-merger price and output levels. When the question instead involves post- merger innovation
levels, a fundamental issue is whether a focus on product markets is appropriate to the analysis.
An argument in favor of taking a product-market focus is that the ultimate aim of innovation—
and the way in which it affects consumers—is the creation of products and processes that allow
an innovator (or its licensees) to compete successfully in one or more product markets. An
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argument against this approach is the claim that the notion of a well-defined product market is
too limiting because the products of the future cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty
and, more fundamentally, that a sustained stream of innovations rather than any particular
product is in the long run most important for consumer welfare. A potential response is to
consider markets defined in terms of innovation capabilities rather than specific products. But
even here one must ultimately tie the analysis to some notion of commonality if not (potential)
competition among products to know which innovation capabilities are relevant.
Consider two firms wishing to merge that have strong R&D capabilities in similar areas
but are not at present significant product-market competitors with one another. From the
standpoint of static price competition, presumptively no public policy rationale exists for
blocking the merger. But if the firms are the only two or are among the few firms that have the
capability to undertake particular innovation efforts, then the antitrust agencies might nonetheless
be concerned with the consumer-welfare effects of the proposed merger.
Antitrust enforcers might be concerned either that: (a) the two firms would have
otherwise engaged in competing R&D efforts that would have led to their becoming direct,
product-market competitors, or (b) the merged firm will reduce its R&D and lower the
probability that even one supplier brings out improved products or processes. The first of these
concerns is ultimately about potential competition in the particular product market(s) at issue in
the merger. The second concern, however, is squarely about innovation and arises even when—
in the non-merger counterfactual—the innovation under consideration might not lead to productmarket competition between the merging firms. The same two concerns arise when the merging
parties compete in what today are unconcentrated markets but where the firms are the only two or
are among the few firms that have the capability to undertake substantial innovation efforts
necessary to develop future products in this area.
These two concerns raise legal and economic issues for market definition and the
subsequent competitive-effects analysis. A first issue arises from the fact that potential
competition cases are difficult to bring successfully in the United States. Courts tend to be
skeptical of claims that a merger will harm consumers by reducing future competition between
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two merging firms that are not at present competing with one another.89 A second issue is that it
may be extremely difficult to define a product market if one does not yet know what the product
will be. A third issue is that changes in upstream innovation can have effects on multiple
downstream product markets. A fourth consideration is that, as discussed above, the relationship
between competition and innovation is much less understood than that between competition and
price or output levels.
In response to these difficulties and to the absence of any express provisions in the
Merger Guidelines for dealing with innovation, enforcement officials and policy makers have
proposed various ways to make market definition more dynamic and sensitive to innovation
considerations. One such approach focuses neither on final product markets nor on innovation
itself, but on “technology markets.” Technology is a product that can result from innovation. In
some cases, technology is fully embodied in some other product thatis sold in the marketplace
(e.g., when innovation produces technology that improves the performance of a home-electronics
component or of some machine tool). In other cases the technology itself is sold in the
marketplace and used as an input not by the innovating firm that produced the technology, but by
its customers who in turn incorporate the component into the product they sell to consumers
(e.g., a biotechnology patent that the inventor licenses to a pharmaceutical company that
incorporates the invention in a drug sold to consumers).
Even though technology markets are—in the end—just product markets, examining them
as a separate category may have the virtue of highlighting the importance of innovation by
focusing enforcement attention on a set of products that results from the process of research and
development rather than from manufacturing or the direct provision of services. Moreover,
technology markets have some notable features that are relevant to market definition and that
may distinguish them from more conventional goods and services markets. For example: (a)
production is often highly uncertain; (b) they are intermediate goods markets and can have strong
vertical issues; and (c) the output is information for which the marginal costs are very low
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relative to average costs (or first-copy costs) and there can be well-known difficulties selling
information, such as those related to protection against expropriation.90
Technology markets may also have quite different geographical features than do
traditional product markets. We note at the outset that geographic market definition is a poorly
understood subject even in the absence of innovation, with much confusion about whether a
geographic market refers to suppliers, customers, or both. The presence of innovation—
specifically, an important role for intellectual property sold in technology markets—can
compound the problems. The reason is that intellectual property can typically be shipped
anywhere in the world at an extremely low cost.91 Given the low costs of transporting
information, the location at which technology is developed has no effect on the cost of providing
the subsequent intellectual property for use anywhere in the world. But does this mean the
geographic scope of technology markets is global?
One approach to defining the geographic scope of relevant markets is explicitly to define
both the buyers and sellers of concern in a particular investigation. For jurisdictional reasons, the
federal agencies and the courts focus on effects on consumers located in the United States. The
remaining issue is where the parties who can compete to serve American consumers are located.
We would expect that suppliers located anywhere in the world could compete to supply pure
intellectual property, but there are limitations that should be taken into account. For instance,
location may affect the innovation process (proximity to specific scientists, information about
consumer wants, etc), and intellectual property may be useful only in certain locations because of
the need for complementary products or due to differences in legal regimes.92 In cases where the
technology is not sold separately but is embodied in other products, foreign suppliers often will
not have the complementary assets to serve American consumers. So the answer may be very
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different when a pure technology market is at issue from when the results of innovation are fully
embodied in another product.
As discussed above, R&D and technology are quite different. R&D is the process of
innovation, and technology is a product that can result from that innovation. To focus on
technology markets is, therefore, to focus on an intermediate product market closely tied to
innovation, not on the process of innovation itself. The shortcoming of using “technology
markets” to address innovation is that defining such markets at best allows one to measure R&D
activity through its generation of concrete, marketable results, which can be an imperfect proxy
for a process that may yield incremental improvements that are not in themselves marketable or
innovations that take some time to be recognized or reduced to practice. A further limitation of
the technology-markets approach on its own terms is that it does not address the enormous
amount of technology that firms produce for internal rather than market consumption; innovation
which is of no lessinterest than innovation aimed at creating technology for license.93
To shift the focus or merger review further from product markets and more directly to
investment in research and development, Richard Gilbert and Steven Sunshine, both at the time
working at the Department of Justice, developed the concept of “innovation markets.”94 The
import of their contribution is to shift attention away from potential product competition and
toward actual innovation competition. In Gilbert and Sunshine’s words, “[t]he innovation
markets framework provides a methodology for identifying mergers that are likely to affect
competition in output markets through a lessening of innovation.”95 Their proposed framework
consists of five principal steps: (1) identify overlapping R&D activities of the merging firms; (2)
identify alternative sources of R&D; (3) evaluate actual and potential downstream competitors to
the merging parties; (4) assess how the increased concentration in R&D would affect investment
in R&D; and (5) evaluate how the merger would affect the efficiency of R&D.
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Although each of those steps is in the abstract a tall order, Gilbert and Sunshine limited
the scope of their proposal to cases in which specific R&D activities could be identified that
could have a potentially significant impact on specific downstream product markets. They
further recommended thattheir approach be applied only “to markets in which R&D directed
toward particular new products or processes requires specific assets that are possessed by
identified firms.”96 Taken together, these qualifications limit the use of innovation markets to
cases in which innovation is at a sufficiently advanced stage that its effects on downstream
markets can reasonably be predicted and in which the pool of relevant innovators can be
determined with a high degree of certainty.97
Despite the cautious way Gilbert and Sunshine recommended using innovation markets,
the idea has met with substantial skepticism and criticism.98 One commentator argued that the
innovation market idea is in most cases “superfluous” and amounts to little more than analysis of
potential competition in product markets, while in the remaining cases it is a dangerous foray
into unknown economic relationships that promises to do at least as much harm as good.99
Professor Dennis Carlton testified before the FTC that it would be too difficult in practice for
antitrust agencies successfully to identify mergers that should be blocked on innovation grounds,
and he opined that “a movement toward relying on the concept of innovation markets could
easily lead to a vast decline in the predictability of enforcement policy and in the reliability of
enforcement in improving welfare.”100 Yet others have questioned the legal basis on which
enforcement agencies and courts could base decisions on non-price effects like innovation.
In the light of such criticism, it is perhaps not surprising that the innovation markets
concept has not to date significantly affected the outcomes of merger cases, although it has
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affected the agencies’ analysis and discussion in a growing number of investigations.101 If
nothing else, innovation has become a focal point that has aided in understanding the potential
product-market effects of mergers in dynamic markets, and the innovation-markets approach has
helped the agencies look more deeply into the future impacts of transactions that would pose
little concern viewed through a static framework geared solely to price and output effects in
product markets with their current structures.
We think the underlying idea of the innovation markets approach—that the set of
competitors is sometimes best identified by examining which firms have the skills and assets
needed to innovate effectively—is a sound one. Now that innovation has become part of the
picture in merger review, however, there are important questions about how to approach market
definition in cases that do not fit the strict potential-competition parameters that Gilbert and
Sunshine established for their innovation-market framework.102 Both the technology-markets
and innovation-markets approaches leave open important questions and have limited application
for a number of issues that mergers raise for technological progress. First, the restriction of focus
to innovation tied to actual or imminent product markets in the respective approaches does not
provide guidance as to whether and how merger authorities should account for innovation that is
not connected to any specific current or future product. Second, both approaches incorporate the
traditional emphasis on market definition but do not address the limitations of market definition
or how its application might need to be modified to address innovation. Gilbert and Sunshine
recognize the difficulty of defining innovation markets and therefore limit their proposal to
situations in which agencies can identify with reasonable certainty the pool of potential
innovators. But neither the technology-markets nor the innovation-markets framework provides
guidance on what, if anything, a finding of increased competition means for innovation or of
what welfare presumptions enforcement officials should apply once they have defined markets
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for innovation or technology. As we discussed above in Part III.1 of this article, findings of
increased concentration at best support only very weak presumptions about effects on innovation.
The most important aspects of determining innovation-related welfare effects of a merger are
therefore not likely to center on market definition but on more direct, factual evidence of
alternative sources of innovation and of the economic incentives of the potential merger partners.
We turn now to the next step in the merger review framework, in which the Guidelines
turn to that more specific factual inquiry, and examine how innovation affects the further
analysis, beyond market share, of a merger’s likely competitive effects.
V.

Further Analysis of Competitive Effects

As a legal matter, if the plaintiffs establish that a merger will lead to high levels of concentration,
then it falls to the defendants to rebut the presumption of a competitive problem by pointing to
other factors, such as the possibility of entry by new competitors or certain market characteristics
that can make it difficult to raise prices (e.g., the presence of large, sophisticated buyers who can
exert bargaining pressure). As the Merger Guidelines recognize, “market share and
concentration data provide only the starting point for analyzing the competitive impact of a
merger.”103 A complete analysis considers both the abilities and incentives of competitors to
expand their output levels and/or change the attributes of their products in response to price
changes by the merging parties that would harm consumers.
A. Implications of Innovation for Further Analysis of Static Competition
We begin our discussion of further competitive analysis by briefly considering the implications
of innovation for static pricing effects. Specifically, we examine the implications of innovation
for entry by new suppliers and product repositioning by existing suppliers. There are two
situations to consider with respect to entry. In one, the likelihood of entry is independent of
whether or not the merging parties would otherwise raise their pre-entry prices. In the other, the
likelihood of entry depends on pre-entry prices and, thus, the threat of entry can discipline post
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merger price increases. The entrants who stayed out under competitive, pre-merger prices might
come in if the merged entity tries to exercise market power and raise prices.
Consider first the implications of innovation for the analysis of entry that will likely occur
regardless of the pre-entry prices. Merging parties often claim that entry will reduce future
concentration and allay competitive concerns associated with their merger. At the same time, the
agencies often are skeptical of such claims and seek tangible evidence of the likelihood of entry.
The fact that one or more firms have engaged in substantial research and development efforts
relevant to the product market at issue may constitute such evidence. Investments in research
and development, as well as in specialized plant and equipment may strongly indicate that the
firms will shortly be entering the product market and, hence, thata merger analysis based on
current market shares would overstate likely future concentration. By the same token, it should
also be noted that the lack of ongoing R&D by one or more incumbents may be an indicator that
those suppliers are going to be of less competitive significance in the future and, thus, a merger
analysis based on current market shares would understate likely future concentration.
Now, consider situations in which entry is contingent on pre-merger prices. These
situations raise subtle issues even in the absence of innovation. When entry is contingent on the
pre-merger behavior of the merging suppliers, the threat of entry—as opposed to actual entry—
can induce incumbents to keep their prices at pre-merger levels or at least to moderate the
increases. Difficult issues arise for antitrust enforcers in part because it can be harder to assess
threats of potential entry than to measure progress toward actual entry.
Economic analysis identifies two classes of situations in which pre-entry prices can be
influenced by the threat of entry. One is where the entrant takes pre-entry prices as a signal
regarding private information that incumbents have about their costs or some other factor that
affects their profit-maximizing prices.104 For instance, an entrant might take pre-entry prices as
signals of the incumbents’ marginal costs, which are relevant to predicting how vigorously these
incumbents would compete if faced with a new, competitive entrant. In such situations,
incumbents may set low pre-entry prices to convince potential entrants that the incumbents have
low costs (so-called “limit pricing”). If there is rapid technological innovation, however, current
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prices may be a very poor signal of future costs and thus may have relatively little effect on a
potential entrant’s prediction of the likely post-entry equilibrium. Hence, the presence of rapid
innovation tends to reduce the feasibility of limit pricing and the disciplining role of the threat of
entry (as opposed to actual entry).
A second circumstance in which the threat of entry may affect current prices is one in
which incumbents make investments before new entrants have come into the market, such as
building large-capacity plants or setting low “penetration prices” to build up large installed bases
of customers, that have the effect of both making the incumbents “tougher” post-entry rivals and
of driving down pre-entry prices.105 In some cases, these effects will make it profitable for
merging parties to forego large price increases even if doing so would be profitable in the short
run. Such pre-entry investments may include research and development expenditures. In other
words, the threat of entry may drive incumbents to innovate as a means of making entry less
attractive and, once the innovations are realized, some of the benefits will typically accrue to
consumers in the form of lower quality-adjusted prices.
Now consider product repositioning by incumbent suppliers. Under a unilateral effects
theory of competitive harm in a differentiated market, the concern is that the products of the two
merging parties are each other’s close competitors and the merger will eliminate localized
competition that would otherwise drive prices to efficient levels.106 A central issue in the
analysis under this theory is therefore whether existing competitors would reposition their
products to compete more closely with those of the merging parties. For example, if two leading
manufacturers of pick-up trucks merge, would other vehicle manufacturers expand their lines of
pick-up trucks to compete more directly with the merged firms’ line? When there is already
significant ongoing or potential innovation directed at a product, some of that innovation can be
used to speed repositioning. Of course, suppliers’ innovation capabilities may not always
support repositioning but as a general matter it seems logical that repositioning will be easier
when the product is already back on the proverbial drawing board for other purposes.
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In addition to considering traditional entry and product repositioning issues, the further
analysis of competitive effects may also be the stage in a trial in which “Schumpeterian”
arguments can be addressed with the least disruption to the overall process typically followed by
the courts.107 Recall that, under Schumpeterian rivalry, temporary monopolists successively
displace one another through innovation and there may be little head-to-head price competition
between the product-market-leading supplier and its rivals at any given time. Thus, in
Schumpeterian rivalry a merger’s static pricing effects may be of little importance to consumer
welfare and efficiency. Under this view, the traditional concentration-competition-welfare
presumption for static pricing would be of comparatively little relevance.
However, the Schumpeterian dynamic does more than extend the analysis of price effects
beyond presumptions based on market concentration. Instead, it shifts the fundamental focus of
the analysis away from pricing altogether. The principal competitive effects of a merger under
Schumpeterian competition would be the effects that it has on the pace and direction of
innovation. Hence, that is where the analysis of competitive effects would focus, beginning with
the weak presumptions regarding the relationship between innovation competition and
concentration, and then moving to a further analysis of the competitive effects on innovation.
B. Further Analysis of Competitive Effects Regarding Innovation
Even more so than with price competition, it is necessary to look beyond market share data to
understand innovation competition. As discussed above in Section III, the theory and data that
support the systematic presumption in favor of increased competition for purposes of static
pricing and output efficiency have no analog when it comes to understanding the optimal
conditions for innovation. Despite the impossibility of making definitive general statements
about the linkage between market structure and innovation, one can often make reasonable
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predictions about the effects of specific transactions within a particular industry based on a factintensive investigation. Here, we make three brief points.
First, for reasons discussed above, it is important to understand the distribution of R&D
assets among various actual and potential rivals. Only then can the case-specific effects of a
transaction on R&D even begin to be explored.
Second, there are reasons to expect that a merger is less likely to have adverse
coordinated effects on innovation than on price. In markets with only a few of competitors
(oligopolies), enforcement officials may worry firms will tacitly collude on price.108 As the
Merger Guidelines note, such collusion on price becomes progressively harder as products and
firms in a market become more heterogeneous and as information the firms have about each
other becomes less complete.109 Although the underlying economic principles for understanding
coordinated effects are the same for pricing and innovation, R&D activities have certain
characteristics that give rise to differences in practice. For example, R&D efforts may be more
complex and multi-dimensional, which makes it difficult for firms tacitly to coordinate
innovation strategies.110 Similarly, the uncertain, stochastic nature of R&D output can greatly
increase the difficulty of reaching and monitoring agreements to restrict R&D efforts. Another
factor is the length of detection and response lags. With process innovation it may be possible to
keep both R&D programs and their results secret. Thus, each supplier may fear that its rivals are
secretly cheating on any tacit or explicit agreement to suppress innovation. Even with product
innovation, where the results often will become visible, this may happen only with long lags after
the initial efforts, which leaves a supplier that abides by an agreement to suppress its innovation
efforts vulnerable to rivals that do not.
Unilateral effects on innovation, in turn, could in principle be quite strong in some
circumstances. The typical question in unilateral effects analysis in a differentiated product
market is whether the merged firms could act without concern that there are firms whose
products are sufficiently close that they provide competitive discipline to the merged entities.
The primary, new issue raised by innovation is that, to the extent the focus is on determining

108

Merger Guidelines, section 2.1.

109

Id. at section 2.11.

48

whether there is localized competition, it is necessary to determine whether the localization
occurs at the innovation or product level. For example, in a race to obtain a patent, localization
is defined in terms of the set of firms with the particular skills and assets necessary to compete
credibly in the R&D for the patent. In other instances, a wide range of firms may be capable of
innovating, but if the innovation has no market except as embodied in specific products, then the
localization of competition of those products should be the central focus.
Our third point concerns process. We recommend that the agencies develop and
articulate a well-defined process or set of guidelines for analyzing the effects of mergers on
innovation, including both a statement of presumptions and a blueprint for intensive, fact-based
analyses of the specific situations. In part, such guidelines would make it possible for business
decision makers to predict whether potential mergers are likely to be approved. A reliable basis
for forming predictions would allow business decision makers to avoid undertaking the costly
process of proposing deals that are later blocked. A well-defined set of procedures would also
improve agency decision making. As we have discussed, mergers can have subtle and complex
effects on innovation, and it is desirable for the agencies to bring the best thinking to bear on
these effects, rather than rely on purely ad hoc approaches. This paper develops a foundation and
initial structure for a more systematic incorporation of innovation into merger review. The
current state of understanding is such that it is impossible to draw up a more complete blueprint
in which one can have full confidence. Consequently, there is a need for continuing innovation
in the antitrust treatment of innovation.
C. What if the Competitive Effects for Static Pricing and Innovation Run in
Opposite Directions?
In theory, the competitive-effects analysis of a merger could indicate that the merger would harm
price competition but stimulate innovation. This raises the issue of how enforcement agencies
will determine the comparative value of those two benefits. Part of the Schumpeterian critique is
premised on precisely this trade-off between the terms (prices and quantities) on which a good is
sold and the nature (qualities and capabilities) of the good that is being sold. The Schumpeterian
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school reflexively resolves this tension in favor of the course of action that will stimulate
improvements in the latter; in favor of innovation. But it cannot be the case that innovation will
always be so likely or beneficial that it will outweigh harmful price effects. On the other hand, it
cannot be true that the opposite bias that conventional merger enforcement has displayed in favor
of price effects will always be correct either. A more careful analysis of the comparative benefits
of price effects and innovation effects is needed. Although there are important differences, in
many ways the issues raised by the price/innovation trade-off are similar to the issues that arise
when weighing market power effects against cost-saving efficiencies in the conventional merger
framework. For that reason, we will discuss both the price/innovation and marketpower/efficiency trade-offs together in the next section.
VI.

Efficiencies and Welfare Trade-Offs

If the analysis of market shares and other market characteristics demonstrates that a proposed
merger will not give rise to a significant competitive problem, one can conclude that the merger
will not harm competition and consumers. But if a significant competitive problem is predicted
by the preceding stages of analysis, then one must conduct another stage of review to predict
correctly whether a proposed merger will benefit or harm consumers. Simply put, a merger that
is expected to give the merging parties the ability to raise prices profitably might nonetheless lead
to greater social welfare and, eventually, to lower prices and/or better products over time if the
merger gives rise to sufficient cost savings of the right sort.111 These cost savings are referred to
as efficiencies.112 Under the Merger Guidelines’ approach, cost savings count as efficiencies if
they are merger-specific (that is, cannot reasonably be achieved by means other than merger) and
are passed on to consumers. 113
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As a general matter, it is very difficult to predict with any certainty the magnitude of cost
savings likely to result from a proposed merger because doing so entails making predictions
about the results of combining complex operations and corporate cultures. Indeed, we are
unaware of any decision in which a court has found that a merger threatened to have major
competitive harms but nonetheless allowed the merger on the grounds that it would generate
offsetting efficiencies. Efficiencies can, however, be of greater significance at the stage of
agency review and can tip a “close call” on whether the Department of Justice or FTC will
challenge a merger in court in the merging parties’ favor.
Merging parties sometimes identify increased innovation capabilities as a significant
efficiency that will result from their transaction. Thus, it may be necessary to predict whether a
merger will improve the combined firm’s innovation capabilities in ways that will generate
consumer benefits. This undertaking can be particularly difficult. Indeed, the agencies
themselves have expressed skepticism about innovation-based claims for a merger’s benefits and
have asserted that “[o]ther efficiencies, such as those relating to research and development, are
potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to verification and may be the result of
anticompetitive output reductions.”114 In other words, there is a danger that the “savings” in
R&D expenditures merely represent a reduction in competitive activities aimed at innovation.
Although the Schumpeterian school may too readily privilege innovation over price effects, the
passage above suggests the Merger Guidelines may too readily discount innovation in favor of
higher output, lower prices, and short-run efficiency.
A. Potential Sources of Efficiencies
A first step toward righting the balance between static and dynamic benefits in the welfare
analysis of mergers is to see how a merger might lower the costs of R&D or in other ways
increase merging firms’ abilities to innovate successfully. There are at least three types of effect
that merging parties might assert would occur: (1) increased capabilities realized by combining
complementary assets; (2) larger firm size, which somehow gives rise to a greater ability to
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absorb the risks of or fund R&D; or (3) less competition and greater product-market profits,
which can then fund R&D. We address these effects in order.
With respect to combining complementary assets, a fundamental issue is whether an
alternative means (e.g., licensing of complementary intellectual property) can achieve the same
efficiencies without removing a competitor. Mergers have specific institutional features that may
give rise to certain advantages in facilitating the exchange of complementary assets. For
example, Professor Oliver Williamson has shown that under some conditions, merged ownership
may reduce transaction costs of exchanging goods and services compared to less integrated forms
of governance like contracts or joint ventures.115 Available research shows, however, that the
issue needs careful attention on a case-by-case basis.116
Turning to the second type of effect, considerable debate surrounds the relevance of firm
size for innovation.117 Following Schumpeter, some observers have praised large enterprises for
their superior ability to attract financial and human capital, bear the risk, and recoup the
investment required for sustained R&D activities.118 Other analysts tout small firms as being
more creative than larger, more bureaucratic enterprises.119 Many empirical studies have
addressed the relationship between firm size and innovation. Most recent research yields a
consensus that, in general, R&D rises only proportionally, and only up to a point, with firm
size.120 The strength of the causal relationship between firm size and R&D, however, remains
somewhat questionable despite the observed correlations. Because many variables correlate with
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firm size, it is unclear in many studies whether firm size itself is a statistically significant factor
in innovation. Although early studies did purport to find significance,121 others have found that,
when other firm and industry characteristics are factored in, firm size does not significantly affect
R&D investment.122 When the focus of analysis shifts from innovation inputs such as R&D
expenditures to outputs such as patents, large firms show no advantage over small ones.123 Data
matching R&D investment with patent output have in fact shown that smaller firms produce
more innovations per R&D dollar and per employee than do large firms.124
The evidence overall thus suggests that, to the extent firm size has an effect on
innovation, its magnitude and direction depend on associated industry-level variables and are
susceptible to few general presumptions. The results suggest that especially large firms have no
special tendency—nor any predictable reluctance—to engage in innovation, and that small, fringe
firms may play important roles over time in technologically advancing markets.125
Lastly, consider the argument that greater product-market profits make it possible for
firms to conduct additional R&D. The profits-innovation linkage has two interpretations. One is
that the potential for product-market profits generates innovation incentives. This interpretation
concerns competitive effects and was addressed earlier in Section III where we discussed the
complex link between market structure and innovation. The other interpretation is that current
profits can generate free cash-flow to finance R&D efforts. Because this interpretation is loosely
a statement about the production of innovation, rather than incentives, we will treat it here as an
efficiency-based claim. A first observation is that a remarkable and dangerous lack of a limiting
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principle exists in this argument. By this argument, for example, why not grant a firm a
monopoly in a completely unrelated market to generate the cash flow needed to conduct R&D in
the market of concern? Second, given the overall efficiency of U.S. capital markets, this
argument is inherently suspect. It is not surprising that, in their review of the empirical literature
some years ago, Kamien and Schwartz found that "[i]n sum, the empirical evidence that either
liquidity or profitability are conducive to innovative effort or output appears slim."126
Thus, neither the evidence on firm size nor that on profitability supports any presumption
that mergers will enhance R&D investment or make that investment more productive.
Assessments of efficiency benefits for innovation will therefore likely turn on the analysis of
whether the merger under consideration allows the combination of complementary assets that
would not otherwise be combined through a means posing less of a threat to competition. We
now return to this question in greater detail
B. Merger Specificity
If a simple, arms-length transaction would allow the parties to reap the cost savings in some way
that would not raise competitive concerns, then those cost savings do not justify the merger. As
should be readily apparent, it can often be extremely difficult to assess whether a practical
alternative (e.g., a research joint venture under which competing suppliers jointly invest in
innovation and share the results among themselves) exists for realizing the cost savings.
Complex issues arise because, in theory, two firms might be able to separate cooperation
regarding product-market activities from cooperation with respect to R&D activities. Thus, in
some cases an important element of merger analysis is to determine whether the parties need a
merger rather than a research joint venture or some other form of research cooperation that
creates innovation benefits without sacrificing product-market competition.
A first step of the analysis is therefore to ask whether the parties offer a credible argument
that they need to cooperate to increase or improve R&D. As part of this analysis, enforcement
authorities will want to ask why the parties need to cooperate; is it, for example, to gain the
benefit of complementary assets, to reduce costly duplication, or to reduce the risk of failing to
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appropriate the benefits of R&D? Once the merging parties establish the basis for cooperative
R&D, the next step is to examine whether the parties can get those asserted R&D benefits
through an institution like a joint venture or licensing contract that would still preserve
competition between the parties in the product market. If so, then society would then have the
benefits of cooperation without the social costs of reduced product market competition and its
associated inefficiencies.
The evidence shows that the second step above—finding less restrictive alternatives to
full merger for cooperative innovation—will sometimes be feasible and sometimes not. On one
hand, the value of R&D joint ventures is sufficiently great that Congress in 1984 passed the
National Cooperative Research Act, amended in 1993 and re-titled the National Cooperative
Research and Production Act (NCRPA), designed to encourage and protect such ventures by
reducing their potential exposure to antitrust liability.127 Although it is unclear how effective the
NCRPA has been, the motivation behind the statute appears to have been sound. For example, a
detailed study of semiconductor R&D found that firms in that industry achieve valuable
innovation efficiencies through joint ventures that are comparable to the benefits that would be
achieved though mergers but without the product market inefficiencies mergers can create.128
Encouraging joint ventures over alternative mechanisms for collaborative R&D would likely be
beneficial in that particular industry.
On the other hand, there is evidence joint ventures will not always suffice. Sometimes
governance of the comparatively arms-length transactions of a joint venture may be more costly
than where a single owner can intervene to set the terms of collaboration.129 In a different vein,
firms may be hesitant to enter into joint ventures with firms they perceive to have a competitive
edge in the use and production of the innovations the joint venture develops, thus making the
firms unwilling to put their complementary assets into the mix without a more complete and
permanent fusion of the enterprises. The upshot is that the evidence and studies on the value of
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joint ventures do not counsel blocking R&D-motivated mergers but they do show that there will
sometimes be a serious question about the merger specificity of innovation-based efficiencies.
C. Tensions between Efficiency and Consumer Welfare
Consideration of efficiencies in merger review typically brings to the fore the difference between
a consumer-welfare standard and an economic-efficiency, or total-surplus, standard. Under a
pure consumer-welfare standard, cost savings are relevant only to the extent that they are passed
on to consumers in the form of lower prices or better products. Thus, a consumer-welfare
standard would not count as benefits any projected savings in corporate overhead that are
predicted to have no effect on product prices. Nonetheless, such savings would represent real
gains to the economy, and they would be counted as benefits under a total-surplus standard.
The analysis of efficiencies from a static pricing perspective often focuses solely on
variable costs, on the grounds that changes in fixed costs will not affect the calculation of profitmaximizing prices. However, a change in the fixed costs of innovation may trigger a change in
the resulting level of innovation (i.e., whether a project is undertaken or not), which then has
consequences for consumer welfare. Consequently, it is important that fixed costs not be
summarily excluded from the efficiencies analysis when innovation is at issue. Another way of
describing this point is to state that it is important to remember that, over a long enough time
horizon, everything is variable. This fact suggests that the tension between the consumer-surplus
and total-surplus standards is somewhat attenuated when one takes a long-run view; consumers
also have a strong long-run interest in firms’ having incentives to invest in innovation, as well as
production and distribution, in order to supply goods and services that consumers desire.
The tensions between the welfare concepts do not disappear completely, however. For
example, under an efficiency standard, one would take into account the fact that a merger might
eliminate socially wasteful duplication of R&D, even if doing so did not speed up the date at
which innovation occurred or reduce quality-adjusted product prices. Indeed, an economicefficiency standard would in some circumstances count as a benefit the fact that a merger slowed
the rate of innovation from a socially excessive level, although a consumer-surplus standard
might find the merger harmful because new products reach customers later than they otherwise
would. Under a consumer-welfare standard the cost savings from any reduction in innovation
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would count as benefits only if passed through to consumers as lower prices, similar to the
criterion for weighing productive efficiencies in the conventional merger-review framework. But
in the conventional, static-efficiencies situation, the consumer ideally gets the same product at a
lower price post-merger (or at the same price, where the efficiencies offset adverse competitive
effects). In contrast, when a merger reduces inefficient innovation, the consumer at best gets a
different (less advanced) product at a lower post-merger price and the price reduction may not
compensate for the difference in product characteristics.
Indeed, there is a broader problem. As discussed next, there may not be a tight
correspondence between the magnitude of the R&D investment and the magnitude of the
resulting consumer-welfare benefit. If merger policy continues to increase its focus on
innovation, it may therefore have to deal with welfare trade-offs that antitrust does not confront
in conventional product-market competition cases. To do that it will need to adopt a more
rigorous framework for judging a merger’s predicted effects.
D. Assessing Consumer Welfare Over Time and Under Uncertainty
Efficiencies are typically difficult to project with any confidence, even when innovation is not an
issue. For several reasons, innovation makes the task even more difficult. First, there is a large
element of uncertainty in innovation, and R&D projects often have extremely long gestation
periods. Second, as discussed above, economists, policy makers, and business decision makers
only imperfectly understand the drivers of innovation. Third, where efficiency leads to greater
product innovation and consumers have heterogeneous valuations of quality, projecting net
consumer benefits can be complex. Finally, to the extent that innovation involves discrete
projects and fixed-cost commitments, even a small change in fixed costs can lead to a large
change in consumer welfare. This relationship holds when the cost change (or other merger
efficiency) tips the balance in favor of a supplier’s undertaking a discrete investment that
generates a large amount of consumer surplus, such as the introduction of a new product. In
principle, the consumer surplus generated by these new services made possible by an R&D
investment can exceed the merger-specific reduction in the costs of conducting the R&D. Thus,
the agencies have to be careful not to measure the efficiency benefits of R&D cost savings purely
in terms of the cost savings themselves. Innovation can potentially multiply these benefits.
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The extent of uncertainty makes the assessment of efficiencies difficult, and the general
lack of sophistication in the treatment of uncertainty in litigation makes the problem worse.
Moreover, uncertainty arises from several other aspects of merger analysis, such as predicting
competitor responses to the merger. In the innovation context, the treatment of uncertainty
becomes even more critical because systematic presumptions about the effects of market
concentration on innovation are at least elusive and more likely impossible. Both in
conventional cases and in cases where innovation is an important consideration, merger review
will have to do a good job of accounting for the effects of uncertain events to ensure its
predictions and presumptions are welfare enhancing.
The current approach to merger enforcement unfortunately does not make explicit the
process by which the agencies weigh and consider the several variables—price effects,
efficiencies, innovation benefits, competitive entry—that the Guidelines factor into predictions
about a merger’s effects and whose values are uncertain. This central shortcoming of merger
enforcement is magnified when innovation is involved. To make the issue more concrete,
consider a merger that would likely increase market power by a modest amount but would, with
less certainty, allow for substantial production efficiencies that make price decreases profitable
for the merged entity. What weight does the less-than-likely efficiency receive in the agency’s
overall assessment of the merger? Zero? Its magnitude discounted by its probability—i.e., its
expected value? Something in between? The agencies and courts have not been clear or
consistent in articulating how different potential effects factor into merger analysis, nor have they
adopted a systematic way to account for uncertainty.
In its 1996 report, “Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace”
(“1996 FTC Report”), the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) came out squarely in favor of
taking into account both the magnitudes and probabilities of potential, merger-related
efficiencies. That position appears consistent with an expected value approach and contrary to an
approach that would drop efficiencies from consideration based on a low probability alone. Yet
the 1996 FTC Report never expressly states how the agency should use the probabilities and
magnitudes of efficiencies in analyzing a given merger.
For their part, the federal courts have often relied on the Merger Guidelines to hold
merging parties to a standard of “clear and convincing” proof that a merger would produce pro-
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consumer efficiencies.130 Such a stringent evidentiary standard has the practical effect of
imposing a probability threshold on efficiencies that has to be cleared before a court will take
them into account: if proven to a “clear and convincing” likelihood, then the efficiencies get
counted (although to what extent is not clear from the cases or agency practice), and if the
evidence falls short of proving that level of likelihood, then the efficiencies are rejected and
receive no weight at all.
The continuing applicability of the “clear and convincing” threshold has been open to
question since 1997, when the FTC and Department of Justice revised the Merger Guidelines to
recognize more formally that “mergers may generate efficiencies, which may benefit consumers
and the economy.”131 The Department of Justice has continued since 1997 to advocate a
stringent standard of proof for efficiencies before the courts, suggesting that the agencies may
still, at least implicitly, impose probability thresholds in their internal decision making.132 In
recent years, however, some courts have rejected the “clear and convincing” language. The
district court in FTC v. Staples stated that such a standard would impose on defendants “the
nearly impossible task of rebutting a possibility with a certainty.”133 The court’s statement
accords not just with common sense, but with decision theory as well. In contrast, the
Department of Justice’s position would require that efficiencies be proved to a very high level of
probability before they could be balanced against anticompetitive merger effects, even if the
anticompetitive effects had no greater a likelihood of occurring or had a smaller expected value.
In place of the clear-and-convincing standard, the Staples court applied a “credible evidence”
standard: “defendants must simply rebut the presumption that the merger will substantially lessen
competition by showing that the [FTC’s] evidence gives an inaccurate prediction of the proposed
acquisition’s probable effect. Defendants, however, must do this with credible evidence.”134
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In a subsequent case, FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals characterized the
necessary level of proof as that necessary “to ensure that those ‘efficiencies’ represent more than
mere speculation and promises about post-merger behavior.”135 But even though the Heinz
decision did not require that the efficiencies evidence be “clear and convincing,” it did require
that the efficiencies themselves be of “extraordinary” dimension.136 If proponents of a
transaction could not prove the merger-specific efficiencies to be “substantial”, the court ruled,
then the efficiencies could not rebut the presumption of harm where the merger would result in a
high level of concentration.137 It is unclear from Heinz whether the court was saying that lower
(i.e., below “extraordinary”) levels of merger-specific efficiency gains could not as a matter of
law be used to rebut an anticompetitive presumption or that lower levels of efficiency would not
as a matter of fact offset the competitive harms from high concentration. Either interpretation is
problematic for effective merger review. If modest efficiencies will be achieved with a high
probability, why should they be barred from consideration? In many cases, they may fail to
offset the presumption of harm. But in cases where the probability of harm is moderate and the
level of that harm low, even modest efficiencies could make the merger welfare-enhancing.
Consequently, there seems to be no good reason to bar such efficiencies from consideration.
Given the history of agency skepticism about efficiencies and the hard time parties have
had getting efficiency evidence credited by the courts, the murky standards raise the prospect that
merger enforcement is driven by likely outcomes to the exclusion of unlikely outcomes, even if
the less likely outcomes would have major impacts if they did occur. Such a focus on
probabilities to the exclusion of magnitudes leads a merger to be challenged and possibly
blocked if it is found likely to give rise to consumer harm even if, for example, there were a 60
percent chance that consumers would suffer $100 million in harm and a 40 percent chance that
consumers would reap $200 million in benefit. In effect, the probability-oriented approach acts
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as if consumers are extremely risk averse, even for products that account for a small percentage
of consumer expenditures.138
We think that agencies and courts can improve merger analysis in the presence of
uncertainty by applying the well accepted body of economic decision theory that addresses how
to make choices under uncertain conditions. Deciding whether to clear or block a merger
involves uncertainty about the prospective costs and benefits of the transaction. A decisiontheoretic approach to choice under uncertainty can be formalized as picking the course of action
that yields the highest expected payoff to the decision maker, where the expected value of taking
an action is equal to the payoffs associated with the different possible outcomes that can follow
from that action weighted by the probabilities that those outcomes will occur if the action is
taken. Rational decision-making under this approach requires an understanding of: the set of
outcomes that can potentially follow from alternative courses of action; the probabilities that the
different outcomes will arise conditional on the course of action taken; and the payoffs associated
with the different potential outcomes.
Consider a simple hypothetical, in which there are four possible outcomes: (a) a
significant increase in market power with no efficiencies; (b) a significant increase in market
power with efficiencies; (c) an insignificant increase in market power with no efficiencies; and
(d) an insignificant increase in market power with efficiencies.139 Suppose that the chances of
the different outcomes arising are 36 percent for outcome (a), 24 percent for (b), 24 percent for
(c), and 16 percent for (d). Finally, suppose that the respective payoffs for the different outcomes
are: (a) 80 million; (b) 80 million; (c) 1 million; and (d) 160 million.
Under the probability threshold approach, efficiencies would very likely be dismissed
because they arise only under (b) and (d), which have a combined likelihood of 40 percent.
However, significant increase in market power is more likely than not because outcomes (a) and
(b) arise with a combined probability of 60 percent. Thus, the threshold approach would very
likely reject the merger. In contrast, the decision-theoretic approach indicates that the antitrust
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authorities should approve the merger in order to promote consumer welfare. Specifically, the
expected payoff from the merger measured in millions is found by multiplying each outcome’s
probability by the outcome’s payoff and then taking the sum of those four products:
80 × .36 + 80 × .24 1 × .24 + 160 × .16 = 15.76 .

It is useful to describe this approach more formally to allow generalization. Let
{ X 1 , X 2 ,..., X n } denote the set of possible outcomes, such as different prices that might arise if a
merger were consummated. Let

i

denote the probability that outcome X i will arise if the

merger is approved. Note that the values of { 1 ,

2

,...,

n

} are derived from the agencies and

courts’ analysis of the observable market conditions. Finally, let u ( X i ) denote the payoff
associated with outcome X i . Then, by definition, the expected payoff associated with allowing
the merger is:
u( X i )

i

.

i

If one measures payoffs so that the baseline of blocking the merger gives rise to an
expected payoff of zero, then the decision-theoretic approach will call for the merger to be
blocked if the expected payoff from the merger is negative and approved if the expected payoff is
positive.
The fundamental point for policy is that the magnitude of each possible outcome (i.e., the
size of u ( X i ) ) and not just whether it is likely (i.e., whether

i

is above some threshold) must

be taken into account if the welfare implications of a merger are to be fully understood.
Arbitrary thresholds for probabilities could rule out consideration of events with major
implications for consumers and that, in the repeated exercise of merger review, could add up to
major welfare costs across transactions.
It is important to observe that the use of a payoff function gives this approach a high
degree of flexibility. The payoff function gives a score to each possible outcome, and that score
can capture a variety of different factors. One is the decision maker’s attitude toward risk.
Suppose that X i is the realized value of consumer surplus under outcome i. If the antitrust
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enforcer’s objective is to maximize consumer welfare and the enforcer is risk neutral, then the
enforcer will seek to maximize the expected value of X i , which is

Xi

i

.

i

Enforcers may, however, be averse to variations in consumer welfare. That is, faced with
two actions that have the same expected level of consumer surplus, the enforcer may prefer the
one that involves less uncertainty about the resulting level. In fact, enforcers with this aversion
to risk might be willing to accept a lower expected level of consumer surplus in return for less
variability in the realized level of consumer surplus. Enforcers’ risk aversion can be captured by
a payoff function that tends to fall faster in response to losses than it rises from gains (a so-called
concave function).140
Suppose that allowing a merger gives rise to a ½ chance that consumers will gain $100
million in surplus and a ½ chance that they will lose $100 million in surplus. The expected value
of the merger’s effects on consumer welfare is zero. Suppose, however, the difference between
u (0) and u (100,000,000) is less than the difference between u ( 100,000,000) and u (0) . Then

the expected payoff associated with allowing the merger, 12 u ( 100,000,000) + 12 u (100,000,000)
will be less than the expected payoff associated with blocking it, u (0) .141
A decision-theoretic approach does not dictate policy preferences regarding how much,
and what kinds, of risk to accept in making enforcement decisions. If policy makers decide, for
example, that it is important to avoid the risk of impeding the efficiency of domestic firms in a
globally competitive market, they can factor a discount on price effects or a premium on costsaving effects into the payoff function of their expected-value framework; they can do the
opposite if the market is one in which there is aversion to risk of short-run price increases.
Similarly, if—as a policy choice—only efficiencies that get passed through to consumers are to
be counted in favor of a merger, the probability and magnitude of pass-through can be variables
that factor into the decision analysis. The expected-welfare, decision-theoretic approach is
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beneficial because it requires that any policy preferences be made explicit; increasing (one hopes)
the likelihood that those choices will be well thought out.
The fact that both competitive harms and merger benefits accrue over time also
challenges the current approach to merger analysis. Here, too, the agencies often adopt a
threshold approach; the agencies are particularly likely to be dismissive of events that they do not
project to take place in the very near future. For example, the Merger Guidelines tend to
consider entry only within a limited time horizon.142 Thus, similar to the treatment of
uncertainty, the treatment of inter-temporal weights is often rather unsophisticated. Indeed, the
two problems are linked. Partly in response to concerns that the future is highly uncertain, the
antitrust agencies tend to take a relatively short-run perspective. For instance, the Merger
Guidelines state thatefficiency benefits that are predicted to be realized only with a lag are
“given less weight because they are less proximate and more difficult to predict.”143
In terms of meaningfully projecting effects on consumers’ economic welfare, however, it
makes little sense to put almost no weight on the future. Entry four years in the future has less
value than entry one year in the future, but it does not have zero value. Arbitrarily cutting off
from consideration entry that occurs more than two years hence, as the Merger Guidelines often
do, truncates the proper welfare analysis. The lesson from decision theory is to factor in
magnitudes in addition to probabilities and to discount those magnitudes over the relevant time
periods.
In this regard, it should be observed that, for at least two reasons, simply using a higher
discount factor to deal with uncertainty is likely to be a very poor heuristic. First, itis not the
case that events farther in the future are always less certain. Second, even where events do
become less certain over time, there is no reason to believe that the expected values will always
fall proportionately with time or the degree of uncertainty, as the following example illustrates.
Consider a project that lowers costs by 20 percent with probability p, by 0 percent also with
probability p, and by 10 percent with probability 1

2p. Higher values of p correspond to greater
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uncertainty (there is a greater chance that one of the extreme values of 0 percent or 20 percent is
realized), but the expected size of the cost reduction remains constant at 10 percent. If the
decision maker is risk neutral with respect to the cost reductions or to consumer welfare, then it
makes no sense to discount the cost reduction as a means of handling uncertainty.144 Doing so,
in effect, throws out much of the information about the nature of the uncertainty and the shape of
the probability distribution over possible outcomes.
Issues of inter-temporal trade-offs under uncertainty also arise when a merger’s projected
competitive effects on static pricing and innovation run in opposite directions. In terms of
consumer welfare effects, antitrust enforcers may face an uncertain trade-off between higher
prices in the short run and lower (quality-adjusted) prices in the long run. In such situations, it
would be particularly valuable for the agencies and the courts to make greater use of the standard
tools of decision theory (e.g., developing subjective probability distributions for critical
parameters and utilizing decision tress to calculate expected values) to make rational calculations
of the expected net present value of benefits or harms.
VII.

Remedies and Post-Merger Considerations

Several public policy responses are available if analysis indicates that the net effect of a merger
in its proposed form may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.
These steps include blocking the transaction outright, forcing the divestiture of assets where
competitive overlaps are particularly significant, requiring licensing of intellectual property to
other firms to allow them to compete more effectively with the merging parties, and limiting the
merged firm’s conduct (e.g., imposing a requirement to offer the same prices to all customers to
prevent the merged firm from targeting customers whose only practical options were the two
merging suppliers).
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A. The Role of Intellectual Property in Remedies for Traditional Concerns
When intellectual property rights are sufficiently strong that licensing is feasible, it can be used
in fashioning a remedy to a proposed merger that raises significant concerns of harm to static
price and output competition. Licensing remedies have become an important tool in the review
and clearance of mergers in markets with considerable past innovation and significant intellectual
property assets. For example, in 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint
challenging the proposed acquisition of DTM Corporation (DTM) by 3D Systems Corporation
(3D).145 The firms competed in the sale of rapid prototyping (RP) systems, which transform a
digitally encoded design into a three-dimensional object. The process can be used to produce
models and even low-volume production quantities by what might be loosely thought of as threedimensional laser printing.
Both 3D and DTM held extensive patent portfolios related to RP systems production that
prevented firms that sold RP systems abroad from competing in the United States. As discussed
below in Section VIII, the Department of Justice was concerned that the merger would
significantly reduce competition. The Department of Justice and the parties reached a settlement
that required 3D and DTM to grant a nonexclusive license to manufacture and sell products
under the defendants' RP patent portfolios within specific fields of use.146 The idea was to allow
a foreign supplier to enter the U.S. market as a replacement for the loss of an independent
competitor through merger. The licensee was required to be a firm currently manufacturing
industrial RP systems in a foreign market, so that it would have a demonstrated ability to
compete.147
As a general matter, there are two antitrust rationales for compulsory licensing: (1) to
remedy a refusal to license that itself is held to be exclusionary and to constitute an antitrust
violation, and (2) to ameliorate the effects of another action that is illegal or—absent licensing—
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would be prohibited under the antitrust laws. Licensing as a remedy in a merger case falls into
this second category.
It is useful to distinguish between a duty to deal with competitorsand licensing as a
remedy because they may have very different effects on incentives to innovate. A general duty to
deal under antitrust law weakens intellectual property rights and may create disincentives to
engage in certain innovative efforts. It essentially tells firms they will have to share the results of
their R&D investments with rivals who have shared none of the risks of that investment. In
contrast, compulsory licensing as a remedy that allows a merger to go through may not weaken
innovation incentives and theoretically could even increase them. For example, suppose that the
licensing allows a merger to be completed that would otherwise be blocked. To the extent that
licensing is a means of restoring competition that is less costly to the defendant than are
alternatives (e.g., dissolving the merger), the defendant benefits from having created intellectual
property that can be incorporated into a remedy. Although it is far from evident that these
positive effects on R&D incentives are significant, the argument does at least suggest that any
negative incentive effects from licensing remedies may be insignificant.
B. Remedies for Innovation Concerns
Merger remedies can involve the divestiture or licensing of assets, including intellectual property,
specifically to maintain innovation competition and not just price competition. The challenge for
merger policy in crafting remedies for cases in which innovation is a central concern is to
identify the right assets for divestiture or, where those assets are intellectual property, for
licensing. In the case where, for example, two drugstore chains seek to merge, divestiture is
relatively straightforward in principle: the parties must divest stores where the pre-merger firms
have overlapping territories. To be sure, assuring that those stores are divested in a way that
maintains their competitive viability against the merged entity may present challenges, but
identifying which stores to divest tends to be easy.
The problem tends to be much harder when the assets to be divested are intended to
maintain competition in innovation, particularly when those assets are human capital. It can be
difficult to determine which personnel are central to an innovation effort and where in the
company they are located. And, although a firm can be ordered to sell some or all of a research
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unit, employees cannot be required to remain with that unit.148 Beyond human capital issues,
there may be questions regarding whether R&D is conducted in a way that it is severable for
purposes of divestiture. Identifying the intellectual property rights that would be needed in order
to make use of future innovation also can be very difficult. These problems are not necessarily
insurmountable, but they do highlight some of the challenges that innovation creates for remedial
merger policy. As the cases in the Section VIII demonstrate, enforcement agencies have been
slowly grappling with issues of innovation-oriented remedies in merger cases over the past
decade.
C. Post-Merger Considerations
Innovation considerations may also affect antitrust policy toward a merged entity after an
acquisition is consummated. If a merger turns out to have anticompetitive effects, it is at least
theoretically possible to “unscramble the eggs” and order the newly formed enterprise to break
itself into its previous components or to divide along some other basis that would restore
competition. Such divestiture is easier when the harm to competition stems from consolidation
of physical assets that can be sold off cleanly. For the reasons discussed above, post-merger
divestiture is potentially a much messier prospect when the harm stems from consolidation of
R&D assets in the form of human capital, and the end result of a forced divestiture might be to
weaken the merged entity without restoring competition.
A detailed analysis of how innovation affects application of antitrust laws generally is
beyond the scope of this paper. But a brief discussion of the role antitrust might play in the postmerger environment demonstrates that the complexity innovation may introduce into the
possibilities for later antitrust scrutiny of the merged firm lends particular importance to getting
the merger review right in the first place. In particular, there are several difficult challenges that
may arise in determining when and how the antimonopoly provisions of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act should apply to innovative firms.149 Suppose a merged entity turns out to become
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dominant. Separating the degree to which the dominance flows from beneficial innovation or
from anticompetitive actions can be difficult.150 Even defining a violation can be particularly
difficult. Is integration of increasingly advanced functions into a product efficient innovation or
anticompetitive tying or bundling? And once a violation is proven, it can be especially difficult
to design a remedy in fast-moving environments of technological change. Antitrust authorities
will face the challenge of crafting remedies that constrain anticompetitive behavior without
reducing innovation or network benefits that may have accrued to consumers.
VIII. Innovation Cases
The U.S. antitrust agencies have by now reviewed several mergers in which innovation was an
important consideration. A review of those cases helps one to understand how far the agencies
have been willing to incorporate innovation concerns into merger policy and also to assess the
kinds of cases in which the agencies have been, or can be, successful in that enterprise.
Before examining actual cases, we lay out three canonical situations to frame some of the
recurring issues. These situations illustrate both the different ways in which innovation can factor
into merger policy and how those innovation related inquiries differ from the traditional inquiry
focused on short-term price and output effects. The first two cases represent the opposite ends of
a continuum that begins with conventional considerations of actual or potential competition in
product markets, where innovation serves as supporting evidence, and runs all the way to cases in
which innovation is the sole or central concern of the merger analysis. The third case illustrates
that situations can exist in the middle where there potentially are significant trade-offs between
static and dynamic competition or there is a need to evaluate alternative institutions in terms of
both types of efficiency considerations simultaneously.
A. Cannonical Situations
The concept of innovation can span a spectrum of activities ranging from pure research aimed at
making discoveries in basic science to developmental activities that apply known inventions and
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scientific results to the improvement of existing products or production processes. The closer the
innovation at issue in a particular merger is to resulting in an identifiable, predictable product,
the more likely the issue for merger review will be how the innovation will affect future structure
and performance in the product market relevant to the transaction (i.e., the innovation impact
effect). The farther the innovation is from a tangible result, the more likely the question for
merger authorities will be how the transaction will affect the likelihood and level of continued
investment in R&D (i.e., the innovation incentives effect). To illustrate how the question for
merger policy changes as the nature of the innovation changes along the continuum from pure
research to market production, we next discuss three abstract cases showing the different
problems that different forms of innovation present for merger review.
Case 1: Innovation that is well underway to create or improve defined products and
processes. We begin by considering situations in which the innovation efforts of the merging
parties and their rivals are largely complete.151 In some cases, the firms may already be productmarket competitors, with ongoing R&D efforts aimed at improving existing products and
processes. In other cases, the firms seeking to merge may not yet be competitors in any product
market, but these firms may be developing products that will enable the firms to compete with
one another in one or more product markets in the future.
In the settings just described, the potential harms from a merger arise not so much from
the elimination of competing R&D as from the elimination of future product-market competition
between the merging parties. Hence, the focus of merger analysis is the conventional one of
product-market competition rather than anything specially to do with innovation. However, the
presence of not-yet-complete innovative efforts complicates the inquiry into how the merger will
affect product-market competition because the central task for merger analysis is to form
predictions about what competition will look like in the future, with and without the merger.
Where innovation efforts are well underway but have not yet resulted in a tangible product, the
ongoing innovation may serve as evidence to support treating the merging firms as potential
competitors: firms that have made substantial investment and progress toward entering a market
are much more predictable entrants than are firms that could merely undertake such investment.
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When the merging firms that do not yet compete in a product market, however, definitive
evidence about cost and demand conditions on which to base predictions of the state of
competition tends to be lacking. Even where firms are already product-market competitors,
ongoing R&D efforts may change the future competitive positions of one or more suppliers.
Case 2: Innovation-based race to market dominance. We next consider situations in
which the innovation efforts of the merging parties and their rivals are the focus of the merger
analysis, and product-market competition is largely unaffected by the merger. One type of
situation fitting this description is winner-take-all competition, where the firms undertake
competing R&D efforts and the winner of this R&D competition achieves market dominance
because of a patent, the realization of network effects, or some other phenomenon, such as the
award of major military procurement contract on a sole-source basis. If the innovation process
literally is winner-take-all, then the question of how the merger affects product-market
competition, which lies at the heart of conventional merger analysis, simply does not arise: the
post-innovation product market will be monopolized whether or not the proposed merger occurs.
The public policy concern here is whether the merger will diminish R&D competition and/or
investment and, thereby, either retard the introduction of new products or result in products that
offer consumers smaller net benefits.
Another type of situation in which innovation competition is the sole focus is one in
which the firms proposing to merge produce similar products in several distinct geographical
markets and are actual or potential competitors in only a proper subset of those markets.
Specifically, suppose that only one of the two firms is present in a U.S. market. Then there
would be no conventional concerns regarding a loss of price competition. But the reduced
competition in other geographic markets could slow innovation and, thus, adversely affect U.S.
consumers.
Case 3: Commercially rational delay in competitive innovation. Our final case
illustrates the fact that there can be a tension, and hence the need to make a trade-off, between
static and dynamic policy objectives. When successful innovation cannot be protected from
replication or imitation by competitors, perhaps because of weak intellectual property rights, a
firm may not race for the lead but instead wait for another firm to do the hard work that the
waiting firm can then copy. If all firms reason this way, then no firm will want to take the lead
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and subsidize its competitor’s R&D, and the result will be a waiting game. Innovation will be
delayed, possibly forever. In this case, antitrust agencies may face a choice between (1) allowing
the waiting firms to merge and internalize the free-riding problem, which would then hasten
innovation but end product-market competition, and (2) blocking the merger, which would
preserve product-market competition for existing products but might significantly or permanently
delay the development and introduction of new products. In other words, the choice is whether
to promote long-run innovation or protect short-run price competition. Similar effects and issues
arise when a merger would increase innovation by bringing together complementary assets but
would harm short-run price competition.
Actual enforcement choices may not be as polarized as in this hypothetical. In particular,
alternative institutions, such as research joint ventures may allow firms to cooperate in the
conduct of R&D while remaining product-market competitors. Hence, the evaluation of these
alternative institutions may be an important component of merger analysis in certain situations
where innovation is an important dimension of market performance.
Each of the three canonical situations implies a distinct kind of merger inquiry from the
traditional case focused on static price effects. The sections below survey actual cases that to
varying degrees reflect the three canonical situations and their associated concerns about the
relationship between mergers and technological innovation.
B. Starting to Take Innovation Seriously
One of the first merger enforcement actions expressly motivated by innovation concerns was the
FTC’s 1990 challenge of Roche Holding’s acquisition of Genentech on the grounds that
consolidation of ongoing R&D efforts would affect the future product market and slow the pace
of innovation.152 The FTC’s complaint asserted that Roche and Genentech competed in R&D for
important therapies for the treatment of AIDS and HIV infection. Genentech was considered to
be the leader in developing such treatments, and Roche was actively involved in a competing
development effort.153
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The FTC framed the issue with respect to AIDS/HIV therapies purely as one of
innovation. The FTC’s focus was on the race to develop products, not on competition in the
market for existing products. Others also frame the Roche/Genentech case as one about
preserving innovation incentives in the market for the drug therapies actually under
development.154
In terms of the three canonical situations we discussed above, the Roche/Genentech case
appears to fit Case 1, in which innovation is a concern principally because of substantial existing
R&D efforts that were very likely to give rise to actual or potential competition in an identifiable
product market.155 First, with respect to treatments for human growth hormone deficiency,
Roche appeared to have reached a point where its entry into the market was no longer speculative
and the question was more a conventional one of price competition than of innovation. Second,
although the potential product-market competition between Roche and Genentech in the
AIDS/HIV therapy market was more speculative because both firms were still in the R&D phase,
the competing R&D efforts were well underway, and the FTC found strong evidence to support
its predictions that: (a) the relevant product market would develop, and (b) Roche and Genentech
were the most promising of a small group of companies racing to develop certain AIDS/HIV
treatments. Thus, even for AIDS/HIV therapies, the FTC did not have to rely on a prediction that
the acquisition would have reduced the rival innovation efforts.
The Justice Department first challenged a merger on innovation grounds in 1993, when it
investigated ZF Friedrichshafen’s (ZF) proposed—and later abandoned—acquisition of General
Motors’ Allison division.156 Allison and ZF produced 85 percent of the world output of heavyduty automatic transmissions for trucks and buses. The companies competed against each other
in the European market for such transmissions but not in the North American market, in which
GM was dominant.157 The Justice Department nonetheless concluded that even consumers in
markets whose concentration would be unaffected by the merger would be harmed by the
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transaction’s reduction in Allison and ZF’s incentives to develop new designs and products.158
This case was the first expressly to discuss possible R&D-related harms to consumers in
geographic markets in which the merger would not directly affect price or output levels, and thus
is an example of the scenario described in Case 2, above.
The ZF/Allison case can be seen as a precursor to the kind of analysis Gilbert and
Sunshine later advocated in their proposed innovation markets approach. In some respects,
however, the case is weak precedent for the recognition of innovation markets in merger policy
because it does not appear that the outcome turned on innovation concerns. The merger to an 85
percent market share of global industry sales of heavy-duty transmissions with a number of other
overlapping product and geographic markets (including non-transmission products in the United
States) probably raised enough conventional concerns about static allocative efficiency to justify
blocking the merger. To be sure, in the ZF/Allison case the traditional efficiency concerns were
less salient because in some important geographic markets the companies did not compete with
each other in the sale of relevant products. In those markets the case against the merger was
bolstered by the argument for preserving innovation incentives even absent concerns for productmarket competition.
Even though there is no evidence that innovation considerations were decisive in the light
of more conventional factors, in one important respect the ZF/Allison case was more aggressive
in its emphasis on innovation than the Gilbert and Sunshine approach later counseled. Gilbert
and Sunshine recommended using innovation markets only where specific R&D efforts that
might be affected by the merger could be identified, as in the Roche/Genentech case. However,
the Department of Justice’s focus was not on preserving innovation tied to any particular product
or identifiable line of research but instead on preserving conditions likely to be more conducive
to any innovation in the sector generally. The Department’s action suggests that, if a merger
would leave an industry with near-monopoly concentration and without other likely sources of
new developments, then harm to potential innovation could justify a challenge to the transaction.
The ZF/Allison action is thus novel because it preserves separate entities not only for
reasons of price competition (in some geographic markets) but also for reasons of future
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innovation (in all geographic markets) on the grounds that it is better to have two potential
innovators rather than one to preserve the possibility for future competition in the sale of new
technology or for future product-market competition. In the context of a merger to nearmonopoly, the idea doesn’t seem so radical; the merger to near monopoly certainly reduced the
potential for competition between the two major firms. But in principle this reasoning represents
an important change in traditional merger analysis. It remains to be seen how deep this change
runs. The case gives little insight into how the agencies would evaluate a transaction in which
the post-merger market share was less dominant or in which only innovation, and not productmarket competition, was at stake.
C. Transitional Cases: Innovation Moves to the Fore
The two factors central to the Roche/Genentech and ZF/Allison cases—high levels of
concentration and competing innovation efforts—have also formed the basis for several more
recent enforcement actions through which the relationship between merger policy and innovation
has further developed.
Aerospace Mergers. The aerospace industry is one of the most innovative economic sectors in
the United States. The market is characterized by high concentration levels but also (outside of
the defense sector) by international competition. In the late 1990s, the FTC and the Department
of Justice approved one major aerospace merger and blocked another, respectively. Innovation
considerations were central to these enforcement decisions.
In 1997, the FTC approved the merger of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, the two largest
commercial aircraft manufacturers in the United States.159 In that case, analysis of innovation in
the aerospace industry supported the merger, not because the transaction was expected to
increase R&D but because the analysis showed that McDonnell Douglas had fallen behind
technologically and no longer could exert competitive pressure on its rivals.160 Acquisition by
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Boeing would therefore not reduce future competition and would allow McDonnell Douglas’s
assets to be put to better use by a more technologically advanced enterprise.
Concerns about technological progress in aerospace led to a different conclusion with
respect to Lockheed Martin’s proposed acquisition of Northrop Grumman. The Justice
Department’s challenge to the merger explained that Lockheed and Northrop were two of the
leading suppliers of aircraft and electronics systems to the U.S. military.161 The Justice
Department concluded that the merger would give Lockheed a monopoly in systems for airborne
early-warning radar, electro-optical missile warning, fiber-optic towed decoys, and infrared
countermeasure systems.162 In addition, the merger would reduce the number of competitors
from three to two in: high-performance, fixed-wing military airplanes; on-board radio
countermeasures; and stealth technology.163 The Justice Department contended that consolidation
in these markets would lead to higher prices, higher costs, and reduced innovation for products
and systems required by the U.S. military.164
Although traditional concerns about adverse effects on price competition were an
important part of the Justice Department’s challenge to Lockheed’s acquisition of Northrop,
innovation concerns were central. For example, the Department noted that Lockheed and
Northrop had both started R&D programs for advanced airborne early-warning radar systems,
and the Department concluded that consolidation of the two R&D efforts would harm future
military procurement.165 The Justice Department also found evidence that competition is
particularly important for technological advances in high-performance military aircraft and that
important innovations have often been made by firms other than the incumbent suppliers of
particular systems. Thus, it concluded that “competition is vital to maximize both the innovative
ideas associated with each military aircraft program, as well as the quality of the processes used
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to turn innovative ideas into cost-effective, technically sound, and efficiently produced
aircraft.”166
The Justice Department’s conclusion in the Lockheed/Northrop case that preserving
competition in the relevant markets would enhance innovation was based principally on two
factors that weighed against permitting the transaction: (1) evidence that Lockheed and Northrop
were either actually conducting competing R&D on important products or were the leading
contenders to conduct such R&D in the future, and (2) evidence that consolidation would lead to
either monopoly or substantial dominance in relevant product markets, not just reducing but in
large part eliminating competitive pressure to innovate.
Thus, to a large extent, Lockheed/Northrop fits the parameters of Case 2; what was at
stake was the race to develop technology that would win a major government contract. The
Justice Department found, at least implicitly, that the benefits of faster innovation and a choice of
alternative technologies offset possible costs of effort duplication in the aerospace/defense sector.
In addition, it was possible that, if the two technologies that the competitors developed were truly
substitutes (that is, both companies developed viable products), then the government would also
get the benefit of conventional product-market competition between bidders for the contract. In
other words, mixed with the innovation concern central to the case was also a more conventional,
static pricing concern.167
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals. In the mid-1990s, innovation concerns played a central role
in the FTC’s crafting of a consent agreement Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz that allowed them to merge
into a new company now known as Novartis. The FTC had raised several objections to the
merger.168 Along traditional merger policy lines, the FTC was concerned that the combination
would give the merged entity power to raise prices in the markets for herbicides used in growing
corn and for flea-control products for pets.169 The more novel parts of the FTC’s challenge,
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however, had to do with research and development and the prospects for future innovations in the
market for gene therapy products—products that allow treatment of diseases and medical
conditions by modifying genes in patients’ cells.
At the time of the FTC’s investigation in 1996 and 1997, no gene therapy products were
on the market or even approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).170 Conventional
merger analysis therefore did not apply because no product market existed in which to analyze
the merger’s effects on prices and output. The FTC instead adopted a dynamic perspective and,
looking to the future, it found long-run competitive concerns. The sales of gene therapy products
were expected to grow rapidly, with projections for a $45 billion market by 2010.171 Ciba and
Sandoz were either among the few or the only firms with the technological capabilities and
intellectual property rights necessary to develop gene therapy products commercially. The FTC
stated in its complaint against the proposed merger that Ciba and Sandoz together would control
essential patents, know-how, and proprietary commercial rights without which other firms—even
if capable of developing gene therapy products—would be unable to commercialize them. The
FTC was concerned that the post-merger company, Novartis, might not adequately license its
gene therapy intellectual property to ensure that other firms would be able to close the R&D gap.
The FTC concluded that “preserving long-run innovation in these circumstances is critical.”172
The FTC did not, however, block the merger. Instead, it crafted a consent decree
designed to correct those aspects of the transaction that raised concerns for current and future
competition and innovation. As noted above, the FTC had conventional product-market
competition concerns with respect to the overlapping herbicide and flea-control businesses. The
FTC accordingly ordered one party to divest those businesses.173 More notable, however, was
the fact that the FTC did not require divestiture of either firm’s gene therapy division. Instead,
Ciba and Sandoz agreed that they would license technology and patents sufficient for one of its
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major rivals to compete against the merged entity in the development of gene therapy
products.174
The FTC’s remedy steered between the potentially conflicting economic effects that a
merger might have on R&D. On one hand, coordinating two entities’ innovation efforts and
possibly consolidating complementary capabilities can enhance innovation and allow the
combination of entities to achieve what the entities individually could not do as easily.175 On the
other hand, concentrating markets to near-monopoly levels can dampen the pressure to innovate
and reduce the enhanced probability of success that comes from multiple R&D efforts. Both
concerns are reflected in the FTC’s enforcement action. The FTC declined to order either Ciba
or Sandoz to divest its gene therapy subsidiary because it found that R&D efforts between the
parent companies and their respective subsidiaries were closely coordinated, making divestiture
disruptive and counterproductive for innovation. The decision instead to order compulsory
licensing to a capable competitor was designed to preserve both competition and the benefits of
the merging parties’ relationships with each other and their respective gene therapy subsidiaries.
The market context in which the FTC’s focus on innovation occurred is significant. The
merger did not simply change the degree of competition within a middling range of market
concentration. Rather, the combination of Ciba and Sandoz concentrated nearly all innovation
efforts and essential inputs for commercialization of gene therapy under one corporate roof.
Innovation concerns were sufficient to motivate enforcement because the facts showed a
combination of monopoly market structure and reduction in the number of actual (as opposed to
potential) innovation efforts. To some degree, this was a traditional potential-entry case with
respect to product-market competition. But the action also broke important new ground: it
expressly recognized that a merger could be challenged on grounds of the effects it would have
on future innovation and competition in a product market that does not yet—but likely will—
exist.
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The contrast between the Ciba/Sandoz action and the ZF/Allison action is an interesting
one. In ZF/Allison, the issue concerned a product market with (as yet) nonexistent innovation; in
Ciba/Sandoz, the issue was innovation for an (as yet) nonexistent product market.
D. Recent Case Developments: More Nuanced Analysis?
The antitrust agencies' focus on innovation in merger review, which became evident in the 1990s,
has continued to develop. Although most innovation cases involve advanced stages of
innovation—so that the issue is more one of potential product-market competition than
innovation for its own sake—the Department of Justice and FTC have both also expressed
interest in protecting innovation for its own sake, as the following cases illustrate.
The proposed $16 billion merger of Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc into the pharmaceutical
company known as Aventis raised both potential and actual competition concerns for the FTC. 176
Innovation was central to the potential competition aspects of the merger. Hoechst had an
existing anticlotting product and Rhône-Poulenc was close behind, with a product almost
through the FDA review process. As in Ciba/Sandoz, the FTC was also concerned about a
combination of patent portfolios, in this case, patents related to anticlotting agents. In December
1999, the FTC entered into a proposed consent agreement settling its charges that the merger
would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The parties were allowed to merge on the condition,
among others, that they divest intellectual-property assets relating to Rhône-Poulenc's direct
thrombin inhibitor drug Revasc to preserve competition and the opportunity for innovation in
direct thrombin inhibition as a superior treatment for blood-clotting diseases.177
The FTC again faced a mix of product- and innovation-based potential competition issues
in its challenge to the Amgen/Immunex merger in 2002.178 At the time Amgen and Immunex
proposed to merge, Amgen had the only IL-1 inhibitor (which is used to treat rheumatoid
arthritis) on the U.S. market. Immunex and one other firm, Regeneron, were the only other
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companies with IL-1 inhibitors in U.S. clinical trials. The FTC feared that the combination of the
Amgen and Immunex patent portfolios might allow the merged firm to block entry by Regeneron
by eliminating potential competition in the sale of intellectual property by the merging parties to
Regeneron or other third parties. The FTC expressed concern not only that the merger would
harm potential product-market competition but also thatthe combination would reduce R&D
competition for related new products.179 The FTC nonetheless allowed the merger to proceed
based on a consent decree that required the licensing of certain patents to Regeneron. The FTC
reached a similar result in its review of the Glaxo/SmithKline Beecham merger in 2001.180
The cases discussed so far may leave the impression that innovation has been salient only
in megamergers where billions of dollars are at stake in the transaction and/or in particular
industry sectors, notably pharmaceuticals and defense aerospace. But that is not the case. As
noted in our earlier discussion of remedies in Section VII, the Department of Justice sued in 2001
to block 3D’s proposed $45 million acquisition of DTM, alleging that the transaction as
originally structured would have resulted in higher prices and less innovation for industrial RP
systems in the United States.181 The complaint alleged that “3D and DTM offered the most
sophisticated systems in the industry and competed directly against each other in the
development, manufacture, and sale of industrial rapid prototyping systems and materials.”182
The acquisition would have combined the two largest manufacturers of RP systems in the United
States; reduced the number of competitors in the U.S. market for industrial RP systems from
three to two; and resulted in the combined company having a U.S. market share, by revenue, of
80 percent.183 The Department of Justice settled the case through a consent decree that required
3D and DTM to license their RP-related patents to a firm that would compete against the merged
enterprise in the U.S. market. The district court’s decision entering the decree expressly
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discussed the merger's potential impact on innovation as well as price competition in the market
for rapid prototyping systems, although the licensing remedy seems more directly aimed at
potential product-market competition than at innovation.184
Taken together, the merger cases in which the U.S. antitrust agencies have made
innovation a central issue fall mostly into the first of the abstract cases we set out at the
beginning of this Section: they have involved innovation efforts sufficiently well underway that
one of the merging parties can convincingly be considered a potential competitor of the other.
Review of those mergers has thus fit relatively comfortably into the existing framework for
merger policy. But at least some cases have paid lip service, or even purported to base
enforcement, on the preservation of innovation for its own sake in a particular industrial sector.
In these cases—for example, ZF/Allison and 3D/DTM—the agencies did not undertake a
detailed analysis of the market structures in the relevant industries that would be most conducive
to innovation, nor did they examine the welfare consequences of reduced innovation in the
industries at issue. In the ZF/Allison case, the Department of Justice appears implicitly to have
assumed that one larger firm would be worse for innovation than two already quite large
enterprises would be. In the 3D/DTM case, the consolidation from three to two major U.S. firms
raised concerns about innovation, although those concerns were deemed to have been allayed by
the consent decree.
In a recent case that exemplifies our abstract Case 2, the Federal Trade Commission took
a significant step toward erasing the key presumption—that very high levels of concentration
would likely be bad for innovation—that appears to have informed the ZF/Allison case. In 2004,
the FTC decided by divided vote to allow the merger of Gemzyme Corp. and Novazyme Corp.,
the only two companies developing therapies for a rare disorder known as Pompe disease.
Genzyme was unusual in that the government approved a merger to monopoly. But the case was
even more exceptional because the FTC appears to have based its decision solely on analysis of
the transaction’s effects on innovation (the very considerations that blocked a merger to
monopoly in ZF/Allison) rather than its effects on price and output. After many mergers in
which the agencies addressed innovation in an ad hoc manner and without expressly stating the
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presumptions they were applying in the innovation context, Genzyme was the first case in which
authorities expressly found the flow of new technology to be determinative and tried to establish
principles for when and how antitrust enforcers should analyze innovation effects when
reviewing mergers.
The FTC’s 3-1 vote to allow the Genzyme/Novazyme merger is accompanied by three
written statements, one by Chairman Muris in support of the majority’s position, one by
Commissioner Thompson in dissent, and one by Commissioner Harbour. Commissioner
Harbour’s statement is unusual in that she did not participate in the vote, having been confirmed
to the Commission after argument occurred, but nonetheless wrote a statement expressing her
views and supporting Commissioner Thompson’s dissent.
Chairman Muris’ statement, which has the legal status of persuasive rather than binding
authority, advocates several principles for merger cases in which innovation is a central issue.185
Implicit in the Chairman’s statement is that the FTC can base a merger enforcement decision
solely on innovation effects. This in itself is an important step. Muris argues that two principles
should guide any such analysis of innovation effects. First, he states that enforcement agencies
should take innovation into account only when the relevant innovators are few in number and
readily identifiable. Second, and critically, Muris writes that the FTC should neither adopt any
presumption about the relationship between market structure and innovation nor, therefore,
presume that increased consolidation will harm innovation. The agency should instead consider
innovation on a fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiry. Muris finds inquiry into the facts of
Genzyme to show that innovation would not suffer and could benefit from the merger.
The dissenting statements take greatest issue with the latter points. Commissioners
Thompson and Harbour argue that the Commission should presume that increased concentration
will harm innovation just as the antitrust agencies presume increased concentration will harm
product-market competition and raise prices. Commissioner Thompson moreover argues that
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regardless of the presumption, the majority’s factual analysis was incorrect and the merger
should be challenged as likely to harm research and development of Pompe disease therapies.
Genzyme serves as an interesting marker for the current state of debate of antitrust and
innovation in the agencies. The FTC, at least, has now clearly accepted that innovation is an
objective that antitrust agencies can pursue in merger review even where product-market
competition is not at issue. Moreover, the majority, at least, treated the innovation analysis quite
differently from a standard analysis of product market prices and output levels. It clearly rejected
the conventional concentration-competition-welfare presumption and opted instead for a direct
analysis of the case-specific facts, similarly jettisoning market definition on the grounds that, on
the facts of this case, the direct effects were able to be analyzed without the formalities of
conventional “hypothetical monopolist” kinds of tests. But the contrary position of two
Commissioners that conventional product-market presumptions should apply in the innovation
context indicates how alive the debate remains.
How salient a precedent Genzyme will be remains to be seen. Time will tell whether the
case marks a turning point in antitrust law after which innovation will be the central focus of
many agency and court decisions, and whether it sets out principles for innovation analysis that
will endure. We will return to Genzyme in our conclusion and argue that the case is a mixed bag
under our recommendations; it does some things right but other things we think would constitute
unfortunate precedent. The case does make one thing clear: innovation is becoming an
increasingly central issue in merger analysis at the antitrust agencies and, importantly, has now
become an issue that itself can determine the outcome of enforcement decisions.
IX.

Conclusion: Implementing Dynamic Merger Policy

We conclude by summarizing our policy recommendations and discussing the application of
these recommendations to Genzyme as an example of how they might apply in real cases.
A. Policy Recommendations
Although there is much that we are still learning about market dynamics and the innovation
process, antitrust enforcers have tools available for taking innovation into account in merger
analysis. The cases in which the Department of Justice and the FTC have already addressed
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innovation demonstrate that the agencies are sensitive to the ways that innovation can affect
future competition in product markets. The use of information about innovation to support
objections to a merger based on potential competition concerns does not require fundamental
change to the existing merger-policy framework. The harder issues for merger policy include
four kinds of problems that transactions involving innovation raise: (1) the need to assess
potential product-market competition from innovation efforts still far from completion; (2) the
question of whether current product sales and production capabilities are relevant to the
assessment of future competition; (3) a merger’s effect on innovation; and (4) possible trade-offs
between dynamic-innovation benefits and static-competition benefits.
The first issue is an evidentiary one. At what point is evidence of innovation sufficient
for the agencies or courts to determine that the innovator is a predictable product-market
competitor? Most of the cases to date have involved innovations that were essentially complete
and undergoing trials and/or regulatory approval. But some transactions will warrant a more
dynamic view of potential competition. The challenge for the agencies and courts in such cases
will not require change to the existing merger-review framework so much as itwill involve
articulating parameters of the factual inquiry from which the agencies and courts will infer
potential competition from evidence of ongoing innovation.
The second issue, whether current market shares are relevant to predicting future productmarket competition, can be addressed within the standard conceptual framework codified by the
Merger Guidelines, and well-developed economic tools are available for addressing the question.
However, a movement away from a predominant focus on market shares and toward a more
refined analysis of industry conditions and the nature of competition would represent a change in
the practice of merger litigation by reducing the primacy of market definition in merger cases.
We do not advocate dispensing with the Merger Guidelines or eliminating market definition
from merger review. Properly applied, these tools are useful and, moreover, they provide some
predictive guidance for businesses. Our point is that insistence on rigid, bright-line market
boundaries will fail to capture the realities of dynamic industries in which innovation shifts and
blurs those boundaries over time. A broader approach that takes into account more evidence
about how competition is evolving in an industry might give a better picture of a merger’s likely
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effects and avoid the errors that could result from the rigid in-or-out view of the hypothetical
monopolist approach to market definition that dominates conventional merger review.
The two remaining problems listed above are more difficult and fundamental for the
existing framework, on both conceptual and practical levels. The questions of the efficient
amount or timing of innovation, and of the comparative values of product-market competition
today versus improved products tomorrow, do not fit easily into the conventional merger review
framework. Antitrust agencies could decide not to address these issues and could retain their
focus instead on more conventional product-market concerns. Or, as the “Schumpeterian” school
advocates, the agencies could refrain from quantifying innovation effects and simply reduce
enforcement, even when it is warranted according to conventional criteria, in thename of not
impeding innovation. But the impact of innovation on economic welfare and the impact of
market structure on innovation will occur whether or not antitrust policy accounts for them, and
there is no evidence that ignoring innovation in the conventional framework or retreating from
conventional enforcement will benefit either long-run or short-run consumer welfare. Hence, if
the agencies choose either of these courses of action (or inaction), judgments about the impacts
for and from innovation would be made implicitly and without reflection. To the extent policy
makers wish to avoid the potential costs of ignoring innovation, the question becomes how
antitrust agencies should proceed to incorporate innovation concerns into their mission. This
article draws broad lessons and makes specific recommendations for accomplishing that task.
The overarching lessons from our analysis are two. First, recommendations for a general
reduction from antitrust enforcement in the name of innovation are neither well-grounded in
economic theory nor supported by economic evidence, so antitrust agencies should neither
systematically retreat from merger enforcement nor shy away from taking innovation more
affirmatively into account in the course of merger review. Second, merger-policy enforcers
should recognize that innovation will depend more heavily on factual inquiries specific to a given
case and less on systematic presumptions of the kind merger policy has long applied to static,
product-market competition.
Our analysis also suggests several, more specific, recommendations that the agencies
charged with developing and enforcing merger policy can implement to address innovation and
its potential effects in the merger-review process.

86

First, the antitrust agencies should develop and articulate guidelines for drawing
inferences of potential product-market competition from evidence of ongoing innovation. Doing
so would extend the existing framework to cover several situations in which innovation plays an
important role in competition and economic welfare and, we argue, should therefore play an
important role in merger analysis.
Second, agencies should continue to expand their consideration of mergers’ effects on
innovation and consumer welfare to cases in which the concern is with innovation itself,
including potential R&D projects that are not already underway but that would increase
economic welfare. Sometimes the static price effects and innovation effects of a merger will go
in the same directions, but at other times the merger might be bad for the former and good for the
latter. The need to make trade-offs between innovation and short-term product-market
competition may therefore arise. The agencies should provide guidance on how they would
make these trade-offs.
So far, the agencies have been cautious in moving beyond concerns about potential,
product-market competition based on well-defined innovative efforts. The agencies also have
not made explicit trade-offs between innovation and short- term product-market competition. The
agencies should, however, consider broadening their inquiry to take these important effects into
account. As we have discussed, this is a difficult task in the existing merger enforcement
framework because the concentration-competition-welfare presumption that informs the Merger
Guidelines, which holds that a significant increase in concentration is likely to harm productmarket competition and consumers, does not carry over to innovation. We find the evidence to
support instead a limited presumption that a reduction in the number of competing innovators
reduces innovation in the absence of any efficiency effects. We emphasize, however, that this
presumption should be fairly weak except in the case of merger to monopoly, and even there it
would be rebuttable. Instead of presumptions, detailed case-by-case analysis will be needed. For
that reason, except in cases of merger to monopoly, enforcement aimed at preserving innovation
must proceed mostly without the benefit of the presumption that concentration will be harmful.
Therefore, a third approach that the agencies might pursue would be to develop the
expertise that would allow case-by-case, fact-intensive inquiries to assess the welfare effects and
trade-offs posed by mergers where innovation is at stake. Academic researchers can make an
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important contribution to this effort by conducting industry-specific studies that provide a deeper
understanding of the history and conditions for innovation in different economic sectors regularly
at issue in mergers. As observed in Section III, empirical research demonstrates that industryspecific factors play important roles in mediating the relationship between concentration and firm
size on the one hand and the pace of innovation on the other. Additional studies of the sort we
recommend might lead to the identification of fact patterns that allow clearer understanding of
how to treat innovation in the context of different kinds of transactions that come up for review.
Fourth, antitrust policy makers should rethink both the emphasis on market definition and
the insistence on bright-line bright line market boundaries in merger cases, particularly in
dynamic markets. There are well- known pitfalls in the determination of relevant markets and the
use of market share to predict competitive effects. We show that the dangers of these pitfalls are
made worse by the presence of significant innovation. The agencies and, particularly, the courts
should be especially careful in an innovation case not to let the mechanics of market definition
and market share calculations stand in the way of conducting sound economic analysis of the
merger’s likely effects. We find that emphasis instead on direct evidence of probable effects of
the merger will likely produce better results in mergers involving innovation, even though that
inquiry may at times be very difficult.
Our fifth recommendation relates to that difficulty and is that the agencies use the tools of
decision theory to deal with uncertainty, particularly with respect to innovation. Under current
practice, for example, the agencies often take an approach of considering a two-year horizon in
assessing the effects of entry, with little or no discounting within the horizon and complete
discounting of anything beyond.186 Similarly, efficiency benefits that are realized only with a lag
are “given less weight because they are less proximate and more difficult to predict.”187 Standard
decision theory indicates, however, thatthese approaches are poor heuristics for calculating
expected payoffs in the face of uncertainty. For example, these approaches to entry tend to
underestimate the effects of potentially revolutionary innovations that have some probability of
having large effects over a period of several years. The conventional decision-theoretic approach
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would be to estimate probability distributions for alternative potential outcomes and then use
those probabilities as weights in projecting an expected net present value of a merger’s effects on
consumer welfare.188 More broadly, the effects of mergers on innovation are uncertain and occur
over time, and the agencies and the courts have not made full use of established decision theory
to structure their analyses of consumer-welfare effects.
B. How Our Polices Might Work in Practice and Make a Difference
Our analysis finds that an antitrust agency reviewing a merger in which innovation is important
should take several steps. First, the agencies should examine whether innovation is underway
that is likely to affect competition in a relevant product market and to account for the likely
effects. For example, if one of the merging parties is engaged in innovation that would make it a
likely new, or better existing, competitor to the other merging party, then the transaction would
appear to reduce likely product-market competition. If, on the other hand, two competitors are
merging but a third party has undertaken innovation that makes it a likely new entrant into the
relevant market, then that innovation may make the future impact of the merger less harmful than
it would seem absent incorporation of the third party’s innovation efforts into the merger review.
In this first step, innovation is a factor in the analysis of future product-market competition. The
conventional concentration-competition-welfare presumption applies here and, if the transaction
will decrease potential competition it will be deemed presumptively harmful.
Second, antitrust agencies should ask whether a merger is likely to have effects on
innovation itself. Will the merger create beneficial coordination in R&D, prevent wasteful R&D,
and/or raise incentives to undertake innovation that are not likely to occur absent the merger?
Or, will the merger create disincentives to invest in current or future R&D efforts? In this second
step, a fact-intensive inquiry will be needed and, except in the case of merger to monopoly, we
advocate that no presumption of harm to innovation follow from a finding that the merger will
reduce the number of firms competing to undertake a particular line of R&D. In this step we
thus counsel against the agencies’ reliance on the conventional Merger Guidelines approach
when it comes to innovation, but also counsel against the anti-enforcement presumption of the
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Schumpeterian approach. The differences in the presumptions applicable to conventional
product market analysis and innovation analysis in merger review are summarized in the table
below.

Table: Comparative Burdens and Presumptions in
Conventional vs. Innovation-Based Merger Review
Static Price and
Output Effects

Innovation Effects

Change in
Competition

Plaintiff’s burden to show harm
with a rebuttable presumption of
harm based on concentration.
(Plaintiff wins on presumption if
it proves concentration in
relevant market and all other
evidence of harms and benefits is
equal.)

Plaintiff’s burden to show
harm, defendant’s burden to
show gain, with very limited
presumption of harm. (Except
in cases of merger to
monopoly, defendant wins if
evidence of harms and
benefits is equal.)

Efficiencies

Defendant’s burden

Defendant’s burden

Third, once an agency determines the effects of the merger on product-market
competition and on innovation, the agency decides whether approving (perhaps with conditions)
or blocking the merger will have the higher net benefit for consumer welfare. In some cases a
merger’s effects on product-market competition and innovation will run in the same direction
and the welfare enhancing course of action will thus be clear. In other cases, there may be tradeoffs between static and dynamic benefits, and the case for enforcement or clearance will be more
ambiguous. In ambiguous cases, we recommend the agency adopt a careful analysis of the
comparative probabilities and values of the various costs and benefits from the merger, rather
than relying on overly simple heuristics, such as simply asking whether harm is likely.
We illustrate these steps and how they differ from current practice by examining a recent
case in which innovation concerns featured prominently in agency decision making. Because we

aggregate welfare affects across different generations of consumers.
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do not have access to the complete files considered by the agencies and courts, we reserve
judgment on whether following our recommendations would have changed the ultimate
conclusion.
The case, the Genzyme/Novazyme merger, is interesting because some—but not all—of
the steps in the FTC’s review are consistent with our recommendations. The case therefore
provides, in a single example, an opportunity to see how some of our recommendations might
work in practice and also to show how other of our proposals might have led to a different
analysis. In Genzyme, which we discussed in Section VIII above, there were three separate
statements from FTC Commissioners, one from then-Chair Timothy Muris in support of the
majority’s decision to approve the merger and two, from Commissioners Thompson and
Harbour, in dissent. We focus primarily on Muris’s statement and his analysis of the merger.
As a preliminary matter, Muris analyzed the merger solely in terms of its impact
innovation and not in terms of its effects on product-market competition. The first step of his
analysis of innovation effects was to eliminate any broad presumption about the effects of a
merger on parties’ incentives or ability to invest in innovation. The second step was, in the
absence of a general presumption about the relationship between market structure and
innovation, to undertake a fact-intensive inquiry into how R&D related to Pompe disease
treatments has worked and is likely to work in the future, taking into account both facts specific
to the merging parties and facts related to the pharmaceuticals industry as a whole. The third step
was to consider both theories of harm and theories of benefits from the merger in the light of the
case-specific facts. Finally, Muris’s fourth step was to attach probabilities to the potential harms
and benefits and to calculate the expected, net effect of the merger.
Muris does several things in the four steps listed above that fit well with our framework.
To begin with, we agree with his threshold finding that a merger’s effects on innovation are a
valid, central issue for antitrust enforcement. And our proposals are broadly consistent with
Muris’s abandonment of the standard concentration-competition-welfare presumption and his
corresponding emphasis on case-specific, factual inquiry of likely effects on innovation is the
correct approach. Similarly, Muris’s assessment of the comparative probabilities of harms and
benefits leads him toward the decision-theoretic approach we advocate for addressing the
uncertain outcomes of mergers in dynamic markets.
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Our framework would, however, approach each of the steps above somewhat differently
from the way Muris does in his statement. First, although we counsel weakening the
presumption of harm from concentration in the context of innovation effects, we do not abandon
it to the extent Muris does. In particular, we preserve a presumption of harm in the case of
merger to monopoly, whereas in Genzyme, Muris abandons any presumption of harm even in a
merger to monopoly. Our factual determination and assessment of harms would therefore
proceed against that backdrop and with a burden on the merged parties to show a lack of harm.
Second, our use of decision theory would work differently. Muris sets out two possible
states of the world: one in which Genzyme’s internal R&D effort fails, and one in which that
internal R&D effort succeeds. He attaches a probability of 25 percent to the first outcome and a
probability of 75 percent to the second. If the first state of the world results, Muris argues the
merger benefits will be very high because the transaction provides the incentive and ability for
the merged entity to accelerate the development of Novazyme’s alternative. In the second state
of the world, there is some possibility of harm because with its own successful Pompe therapy,
Novazyme might retard further development of Novazyme’s alternative therapy. Muris argues
the likelihood of such conduct is slim, however. His cost- benefit calculation therefore looks like
(.25) x (large benefit) – (.75) x (small harm), leading Muris to conclude there is a net benefit to
be expected from the merger.
We have two concerns about this calculation, even while applauding the general
approach. Our first concern is that there is no inquiry in the Chairman’s analysis whether the
large benefit in the first state of the world is merger-specific. To the extent that a joint venture
with either Genzyme of a different R&D partner could accelerate Novazyme’s R&D, that benefit
should be discounted in the cost/benefit assessment of the merger. Our second concern is that
the low value Muris assigns to the harms in the second state of the world is not well justified by
his analysis. Muris finds a high probability, 75 percent, that Genzyme’s internal R&D effort will
succeed. He then finds that if Genzyme succeeds there is a small chance thatGenzyme will pull
back efforts on Novazyme’s product. From that small chance, Muris infers a small harm. But
Muris nowhere discusses what the magnitude of that harm would be if the small chance came to
pass. He says only that the conditional likelihood of the harm—reduced development of
Novazyme’s alternative therapy—is low and, multiplying the high probability of the second state
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of the world by that small likelihood, concludes that the expected magnitude of harm in that state
is low. But the calculation misses an important ingredient, which is the fact that the harm from
slowing innovation in an alternative therapy could be very high, even if the likelihood is low. So,
Muris’s harms calculation needs an additional, intermediate step: multiplication of the low
likelihood of harm in the second state of the world by the magnitude of that harm. It is the
product of that calculation that should, under a correct decision-theoretic approach, in turn be
multiplied by the .75 probability of the second state of the world. In principle, the net result of
the corrected welfare calculation could be quite different from Muris’s result.
Our final concern with Muris’ analysis involves a step he did not take. He nowhere
analyzes the product-market effects of the merger, although from the facts it is far from clear that
there are no such effects. Although his statement does not offer an explanation for the gap, it is
possible that the winner-take-all nature of the race to develop a Pompe therapy made the product
market appear to be unaffected. But a longer-run view of product-market competition might
reveal that the merger could have very real effects on potential competition to develop secondgeneration Pompe therapies by leaving only one rather than two firms in the market to engage in
follow-on R&D. As we discussed in Section III, it is particularly for second-generation
innovation that monopoly brings comparative disadvantages to competition. Absent inclusion of
potential product-market effects, the ultimate welfare calculation for the majority’s approval of
the Genzyme/Novazyme transaction appears incomplete.
Although we are critical of some aspects of Chairman Muris’ analysis, we support his
general approach and believe the decision to be significant. We do not support the view of the
dissenting statements thatthe conventional merger enforcement framework and presumptions
should apply without engaging the different and complex ways that innovation might interact
with the goals and presumptions of that framework.
The Genzyme case leaves us hopeful. It represents a continued willingness of the antitrust
agencies to adapt merger review to the task of better accounting for and preserving innovation.
Our goal has been to strengthen the argument in favor of undertaking that task and to offer
improved tools with which to complete it.
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